The "Schrempp Discount"
It is interesting that the material, nonpublic and stock-boosting information in the DaimlerChrysler insider trading investigation by Germany's securities regulator, BaFin, is that DaimlerChrysler's chief executive, Jürgen E. Schrempp, would resign. According to this article in the NY Times, following the announcement of his resignation on July 28, shares of DaimlerChrysler spiked up more than 10%. There were unusually heavy purchases in the stock in the hours before the announcement, however, which caused the BaFin to open an investigation.
The article notes that "[a]nalysts had long factored a 'Schrempp discount' into Daimler's stock price, so advance knowledge of the increasingly embattled chief executive's departure would have been highly valuable."
So basically it appears that Schrempp's presence as CEO of DaimlerChrysler was having a widely-known, material, negative effect on the price of the company's stock--the Schrempp discount. Could that be the basis for a lawsuit? The failure to resign as CEO when you know or should know that your resignation would have an immediate and materially positive impact on the price of the company's stock?
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