The New Case Surge Continues
This just in - new federal securities class actions continued to be filed at a strong pace.
Indeed, strong may be a bit of an understatement as the activity in January 2008 is nearly 50% over historical levels when extrapolated out to a yearly basis.
The numbers are a little fuzzy (see our earlier post here on why that is) but at least 24 new federal securities class actions were filed in January 2008. That translates to 288 new cases per year.
Compare that to the 9 new federal securities class actions filed in January 2007, and the results are even starker. New case filings are up more than 250% from the same period last year.
And lest you say that this new crop of cases solely relates to the burgeoning subprime crisis, the newly filed cases involving Panera Bread, Comcast and American Dental Partners, among others, have little, if anything to do with mortgages, subprime or otherwise.
As far as the fuzziness of the numbers, it has to do with whether new cases will be consolidated with earlier (or later) cases involving similar claims, but filed in different jurisdictions (Freddie Mac), or against different defendants (Countrywide) for example.
And while four of those 24 cases may be reasonably predicted to later be consolidated into other actions, but that would still leave 20 new cases in one month. That would still translate to 240 new federal securities class action cases on an annualized basis, a nearly 25% jump over historical averages.
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Monday, November 12, 2007 |
Class Actions Above Historical Levels
As recently noted by Kevin LaCroix over at The D&O Diary, new case filings are not only up dramatically from the artificially low levels that we saw in 2005 and 2006, they are in fact ABOVE historical levels.
But the numbers are even more striking than first reported. During the period from August 1, 2007 through October 31, 2007, there were at least 65 new federal securities class actions filed, and possibly as many as 68.
That translates into between 260 and 272 new federal securities class action filings per year.
Compared to the historical averages that have been reported by Stanford/Cornerstone (193 per year from 1996-2006) or PwC (218 per year from 2002-2006) that represents an annualized increase over historical levels of between 19 and 41%.
I hesitated to use an equivocation phrase such as "at least" in my figures, especially given that my research team is focused on rooting out securities class actions wherever they may be in the four corners of the world, but there is a rational reason for giving a range instead of a hard number.
Two of the cases, Countrywide Financial Corp. (NYSE: CFC) and RAIT Financial Trust (NYSE: RAS), have companion "niche" cases that were brought on behalf of purchasers of only a specific type of securities. These types of cases are generally consolidated into the broader class action. Occasionally, but not always a lead plaintiff or class representative is appointed on behalf of the niche class. See generally In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. 1998) (appointing a separate lead plaintiff to represent PRIDES purchasers, but declining to appoint a separate lead plaintiff to represent options purchasers).
In the case of Countrywide, the niche case is on behalf of purchasers of Capital V Preferred Stock, and in the case of RAIT Financial, the niche case is on behalf of purchasers of Series A, B, and C Preferred Shares.
In any event, the return to historical levels of securities class action activity appears to have gone on for long enough to be a bona fide trend, and the death notice of the securities class action can safely be tucked away for now. If only we could do the same for buried notice...
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Thursday, October 25, 2007 |
Updated List of Securities Class Action Trials
Due to overwhelming reader demand, we have produced a short presentation that details the 15 securities class action cases that have gone to trial since 1996.
The cases fall into three categories:
1.Securities Class Action Trials Based on Post-Reform Act Conduct Resulting in a Verdict at Trial (four)
2. Securities Class Action Trials Based on Post-PSLRA Conduct Resulting in a Settlement or Summary or Default Judgment During Trial (six)
3. Securities Class Action Trials Based on Pre-PSLRA Conduct Resulting in a Verdict at Trial (five)
We have not yet added the JDS Uniphase case to the presentation, but will do so when it fits into one of our three categories.
Readers are encouraged to send in any updates, additions, or corrections.
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Wednesday, October 24, 2007 |
I Shall Call Him, "Mini PSLRA"
In our spare time we were perusing the recently released 2007 edition of the "Survey of State Class Action Law" from the American Bar Association's Litigation Section.
We fully intended to read all 569 fascinating pages, but right there on Page 26 was the following little gem:
Arizona has adopted legislation mirroring the federal Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 et seq. Arizona’s statute, found at A.R.S. §§ 44-2081 to 44-2087, applies to all private actions arising under Arizona securities law. For any private action brought as a plaintiff class action under Arizona or federal rules of civil procedure, the plaintiff is required to comply with specific requirements which mirror those in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2). For instance, each plaintiff seeking to serve as a class representative must file with the complaint a sworn certification and must publish notice to members of the purported class. See A.R.S. § 44-2081(B), (D). The court then appoints a “lead plaintiff” in accordance with procedures which mirror those in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3). See A.R.S. § 44-2081(E), (F).
Not believing our eyes, we ran to the Arizona Revised Statutes and looked it up. Turns out the statute was passed just after the PSLRA went into effect and has been on the books since April 1996. Of course, our good friends SLUSA and CAFA have made this particular statute not much more than an interesting anecdote.
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Tuesday, May 8, 2007 |
Accountability Goes Global: Part Deux
The companion paper to our upcoming webcast is now available for public consumption here.
Some key findings:
- The first instance we were able to find of an international institutional investor seeking to serve as a lead plaintiff was in 1999, in the Network Associates litigation.
- Every year since then has seen at least one international institutional investor seeking to serve as a lead plaintiff in a class action.
- International institutional investors sought to serve as lead plaintiffs 182 times in 98 different cases during that period.
- The cases where these investors were involved were not limited to those involving non-US companies - Prominent examples included Delphi, Coca Cola, General Motors, and Dell.
- The international institutional investors that filed lead plaintiff motions were from 17 different countries. Germany, Canada, and Israel were the countries with the largest number of movants.
- The lead plaintiff movants were represented by 23 different law firms. The law firm that represented international institutional investors most often – Milberg Weiss, followed by Schiffrin Barroway Topaz & Kessler, Bernstein Litowitz, Berger & Grossman, and Grant & Eisenhofer.
We hope to update this research on an annual basis, so stay tuned...
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Tuesday, April 3, 2007 |
Q1 Review: New Cases Up, Settlements Even
A quick review of the SCAS database reveals that 30 new federal securities class actions were filed in the first quarter of 2007. On a pro-rata basis, this would translate to 120 new federal securities class actions for the year. This would represent a slight increase from 2006 securities class action filings, but would still remain below historical levels in the post-PSLRA world.
Additionally, 41 federal securities class action settlements received final approval during the first quarter of 2007. On a pro-rata basis, this would translate to 164 federal securities class action settlements for the year. This would put 2007 within the margin of error for settlements during the last few years.
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Friday, March 9, 2007 |
Another Case Added to Options Backdating List
Our options backdating securities class action list has been updated to add HCC Insurance Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: HCC). The number of companies on the list now stands at 27.
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Friday, November 17, 2006 |
More on Prof. Coffee and the Paulson Committee
In an article in the November 16, 2006, New York Law Journal, Prof. John Coffee writes that notwithstanding what he labels some "dubious reporting" by the New York Times, he has not recommended to the Paulson Committee that "any private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 could and should be eliminated by SEC rule-making." He writes that his proposal (which is set forth in detail in this October 2006 law review article) actually is far more modest:
But the boldest and most fundamental of the reforms that I would recommend asks the SEC to adopt an exemptive rule under § 36 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that would shield a non-trading public corporation from liability for monetary damages under Rule 10b-5. This would not eliminate a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5, but it would force the plaintiff's bar to sue and settle with corporate officers and agents--i.e., auditors, underwriters, and law firms--instead of treating the corporate entity as the deep pocket that paid everything. Such litigation is entirely feasible, as shown by the fact that in the Enron and WorldCom cases, which are the two largest settlements in securities class action history, the bankrupt corporate entity was not sued, yet record recoveries were obtained.
He also notes that § 36 could be used to "recast securities litigation" in another way, by providing auditors with a partial exemption in the form of a ceiling against catastrophic liability.
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Wednesday, November 15, 2006 |
Breaking Down the Royal Ahold Attorneys' Fee Award
Judge Blake in the USDC for the District of Maryland has issued this opinion awarding attorneys' fees in the massive $1.1 billion Royal Ahold settlement. Some quick but notable points:
1. Class counsel (Entwistle and Cappucci) was permitted under its retainer agreement with lead plaintiff COPERA to seek up to 20% of the settlement amount, but instead sought just 15% ($163.3 million, or a multiplier of 3.21 times the lodestar of $50.8 million).
2. The Court awarded Class Counsel 12% ($130.6 million), lopping off nearly $33 million from the requested amount. The Court stated:
I agree with plaintiffs that the range of comparable settlements should include some below $1 billion as well as those few that substantially exceed $1 billion.9 Strictly on a percentage comparison approach, a 12% fee award appears to me a reasonable percentage of the class recovery.Application of the Barber factors, some of which already have been addressed, also supports an award of this magnitude. On the one hand, settlement was achieved well before trial, presumably aided by significant concessions about the fraud at U.S. Food Service and the existence of “side letters” related to the joint venture consolidation. While some of the legal issues were familiar, others were more difficult and, at least as to subject-matter jurisdiction, novel in this Circuit. While the case was not “undesirable,” lead counsel was required to and did devote exceptional resources to the prosecution, facing some risk of non-recovery as the fee was entirely contingent under the retainer agreement with COPERA, and Royal Ahold’s financial position was unclear. The global aspect of the case raised additional practical and legal complexities, as did the parallel criminal proceedings in another district. The settlement obtained is among the largest cash settlements ever in a securities class action case and represents an estimated 40% recovery of possible provable damages. The notice process appears to have been very successful not only in reaching but also in eliciting claims from a substantial percentage of those eligible for recovery.
The court concluded by noting (listen up Lies, Damn Lies and WSJ Law Blog!) that
Finally, plaintiffs’ counsel were vigorous and extremely competent in their litigation against equally well-qualified defense firms.
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Friday, November 10, 2006 |
More on the Fastow Deposition: No Ninjas
As discussed in advance here, Alexei Barrionuevo of the New York Times has this excellent article about the deposition of Andrew Fastow in the Enron case, which ended November 2 after eight and a half days of apparent drama, drudgery and even some comedy. According to the article, Fastow did not produce any smoking guns, but exhibited an impressive consistency over the nine days of his questioning.
The article also recounts an interesting event on the first day of the deposition:
Tensions were high that first morning, according to several people who witnessed the deposition. About 30 lawyers packed into the main conference room, sitting on either side of Mr. Fastow. Almost 40 more watched on video feeds in two overflow rooms.
Suddenly, four shadowy figures with ropes appeared, hanging outside the windows of the main room, which had the blinds drawn. A marshal scrambled to the windows. One lawyer for a major bank said the figures resembled ninjas. It turned out they were window washers.
“A lot of uncomfortable smiles broke out,” Mr. Heaton said....
Finally, the article suggests that my pre-deposition estimate that the Fastow depo would end up being a $3.2 million event was too high:
The deposition drew lawyers representing 10 major banks and top Enron executives who have not been charged with crimes. It was also streamed live over the Internet so law firms in New York, London and elsewhere could listen in.
With the typical lawyer in the case billing about $450 an hour, the legal fees just to follow the testimony could cost at least $2.1 million, and the overall price tag of the litigation is expected to reach hundreds of millions of dollars.
Doing the math on the NYT estimate, the article is assuming 7 hours days for each of the 70 lawyers, at $450/hour, for 9.5 days. I assumed 10 hour days, which is the key difference between the estimates. Not that it really matters but the article notes that the depo went from 9 am-6 pm most days, with only occasional breaks. That's 9 hours right there, and when you add in the travel time ... I'm thinking that my 10 hour/day estimate is probably closer to what was billed in this case.
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Tuesday, October 31, 2006 |
Plaintiffs' Bar Shoots Back
After a flurry of recent coverage in the NY Times and elsewhere of the Paulson Committee and the prospect that it may soon recommend, among other things, that the SEC "dis-imply" a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 against corporations, the plaintiffs' bar is finally shooting back. In this article in Business Insurance, several prominent members of the plaintiffs' securities class action bar were not shy about voicing their concern and outrage over this prospect:
"Securities lawsuits have fallen off sharply in the last few years and yet they want to further cripple them," said Bill Lerach, a prominent class-action lawyer from San Diego, Calif., law firm Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins L.L.P. "Why? Because it's the one effective weapon that shareholders have."
***
"I think it's outrageous," class-action attorney Stanley Grossman, senior partner at Pomerantz Haudek Block Grossman & Gross L.L.P. in New York, said of the proposals.
"We keep reading every day about more and more fraud," he said. "What the SEC is saying is 'we can't handle it all. We need companies to do the internal investigation.' Well, if they're so overwhelmed, how are they going to pick up all of these cases of the plaintiffs' bar?"
***
Another prominent class-action attorney, Sean Coffey, who helped win a $6.15-billion settlement for investors in WorldCom Inc., said the proposed curbs on shareholder litigation suggest that corporate America has already forgotten the string of business scandals that took place in recent years.
"The body isn't cold yet, and they are already acting like there were no corporate scandals," said Mr. Coffey, of the law firm Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossman. "It's mind-boggling."
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Monday, October 16, 2006 |
"Paulson Committee" May Soon Recommend Dramatic Limits on Securities Class Actions
Since early September 2006, a committee composed of "independent ... U.S. business, financial, investor and corporate governance, legal, accounting and academic leaders" has fairly quietly been conducting a study into how to improve the competitiveness of the U.S. public capital markets. Next month this committee (The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, also referred as the "Paulson Committee" because it will present its recommendations to US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson), will issue an interim report with recommendations on several topics. Most notably for this blog, these topics include "Liability issues affecting public companies and gatekeepers (such as auditors and directors) with a focus on securities class action litigation...."
An article in today's BNA Securities Law Daily states that John Coffee, a professor at Columbia University School of Law, said at a recent ALI-ABA conference that he is an adviser to the panel and has suggested several reforms designed to mitigate the threat of securities litigation. According to the article, Coffee believes that in the "near future," the Paulson Committee can be expected to make recommendations "to impose limits on securities class actions" and that the "SEC could take some action to change the role of [the] securities class action" in the next 6 months.
Among the possible changes that could result, Coffee said, were the eye-opening ideas that:
1. The SEC could "dis-imply" a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 against corporations, leaving enforcement of that rule to the government, not private plaintiffs. The SEC might also "dis-imply" such a private cause of action with respect to the corporation only when the SEC has sued the corporation. Coffee states in the article that "That idea does have some support."
or
2. "Stock drop" cases could be moved out of the courts and into the arbitration arena.
The Paulson Committee's recommendations are due out by the end of November 2006. If either of these ideas are among them, look for a barrage of deafeningly loud disapproval from the plaintiffs' bar and consumer groups.... Stay tuned.
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Thursday, October 12, 2006 |
The 36 Million Dollar Man
Kudos to Curtis Kennedy, the Denver attorney who successfully challenged the attorneys' fee award in the Qwest Communications securities litigation, and did so at a reasonable cost to the class. As discussed in this article, the court in the Qwest case recently approved the $400 million settlement of shareholder claims against Qwest, but reduced attorney fees by $36 million--from $96 million to $60 million. Kennedy, representing the Association of U S West Retirees, fought the $96 million in attorney fees requested by lead counsel in the case, law firm Lerach Coughlin, calling the fees "excessive and tantamount to winning the lottery."
According to another article in today's Rocky Mountain News, while Kennedy could attempt to obtain a percentage of the $36 million he helped save the class, he is not doing so. Rather, he is seeking only $40,500, which according to the article is "the 90 hours Kennedy spent on the case times his hourly rate of $300 times 1.5." Kennedy states in the article that he declined to seek a percentage of the $36 million because "I just think that would be hypocritical after asking the judge to apply moderation" to the $96 million request by Lerach Coughlin.
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Tuesday, October 10, 2006 |
"Esquire Bank" Now Serving Plaintiffs' Lawyers

I must admit I didn't see this one coming. Courtesy of the WSJ Law Blog we've just learned about Esquire Bank, "the first bank in the country to specialize in serving trial lawyers." Esquire Bank opened its doors in Brooklyn, New York last week.
I know there is a joke in here somewhere but I'm pretty much speechless. I guess all I can muster at this point is "Watch out for that lender liability!"
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Wednesday, October 4, 2006 |
The $3.2 Million(?) Deposition
The eagerly awaited deposition of former Enron CFO Andrew Fastow in the massive Enron securities class action that is still going pending against numerous large investment banks (many other defendants have settled) may occur soon. According to this article in the NY Times, plaintiffs' counsel in the case has asked the Court to schedule the deposition soon, before Fastow is assigned to a prison. Fastow is currently in solitary confinement in a Houston detention center, awaiting assignment.
The article notes that the deposition of the now-cooperating Fastow will be critical to the case, and "will take an estimated 10 days, plus more than two weeks of preparation, said one lawyer involved in the case. Some 80 lawyers will probably to want to attend."
Whoa--80 lawyers? By my quick math, 80 lawyers billing 10 hours per day for 10 days, at a rate of $400/hour* adds up to a $3,200,000 deposition. And that just for the event itself, not including any of the preparation that these 80 lawyers will need to do.
Hopefully this deposition will prove more fruitful than the discovery to date in the case. The article notes that so far in the case, millions of pages of documents and hundreds of other depositions have amounted to very little information for the plaintiffs:
Despite truckloads of documents from Enron and the banks, and millions of dollars spent on the case so far, civil lawyers had struggled to learn much of anything from the banks’ own employees. Plaintiffs’ lawyers took 175 depositions from bank officials over the last 18 months, most of them running 15 hours long. Yet nearly all of those officials either exercised their Fifth Amendment right to not testify or said they did not recall anything relevant, according to two lawyers involved in the case.
* I'm three years removed from private practice so I'm guessing on the $400/hour average billing rate of the presumably high-level lawyers who will be present. I guess I'm excluding people like 4-digit man Ben Civiletti. Anyone care to refine my estimate?
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Wednesday, September 13, 2006 |
The Milberg Effect? Not So Much
The WSJ had a Review and Outlook piece yesterday entitled "The Milberg Effect," which argues that the projected drop-off in securities class action cases in 2006 suggested by a recent study is due to a reduction in the number of cases filed by the law firm Milberg Weiss. According to the WSJ piece,
According to Cornerstone, a research firm that tracks litigation, law firms filed 179 class actions last year. The first six months of this year saw only 61, a rate that would result in about 123 class actions for the year -- or a decrease from 2005 of 56 suits. Meanwhile, according to publicly available press releases, Milberg Weiss filed 91 of last year's suits. Yet in the first six months of this year, having come under prosecutorial scrutiny and lost many lawyers, the firm has filed only 17. At this rate, Milberg would tally about 34 suits for the year -- or 57 fewer than 2005.
These numbers are more than a coincidence, and should put to rest the assumption that Sarbanes-Oxley or better corporate governance standards are producing fewer causes of legal action. Securities lawyers have long understood that most class actions have little or no substance but are manufactured by the plaintiffs bar to pad their own pocketbooks.
This is simply wrong. Contrary to the conclusion in the piece above, the projected overall drop-off of 56 class actions in 2006 and the projected Milberg drop-off of 57 class actions filings is a coincidence. The flaw in the WSJ's analysis is that it rests on the false assumption that each of the companies that are the subject of a securities class action are sued by only one law firm. That is not the case.
To develop this point a bit, the Cornerstone study projects that at the current rate, 123 companies will be the subject of a securities class action lawsuit this year--56 fewer than in 2005. It is critical to note here, however, that virtually all (let's conservatively go with 90%) of these 123 cases will involve multiple complaints filed by multiple law firms. Indeed, many companies will be sued by a dozen or more different law firms. Using this conservative 90% figure, if Milberg does file 57 fewer complaints in 2006, this drop-off will only impact the total number of companies that are the subject of a securities class action in the 10% of Milberg's filings where it is the only law firm to file a complaint. So we're looking at a possible reduction of 5 or 6 cases (5.7 to be exact), not 57 cases.
The Milberg Effect? Not so much.
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MD&A Risk Factors (Nelson Rocks Preserve-style)
Courtesy of Overlawyered.com, I found this inspiring Disclaimer on the Nelson Rocks Preserve website. Nelson Rocks Preserve is an outdoor recreation area located in West Virginia that is apparently tired of people suing them when they fall off cliffs, get bit by snakes, etc. They are responding with a disclaimer that reminds would-be users of the preserve of important things like "a whole rock formation might collapse on you and squash you like a bug" or
...climbing is extremely dangerous. If you don't like it, stay at home. You really shouldn't be doing it anyway. We do not provide supervision or instruction. We are not responsible for, and do not inspect or maintain, climbing anchors (including bolts, pitons, slings, trees, etc.) As far as we know, any of them can and will fail and send you plunging to your death. There are countless tons of loose rock ready to be dislodged and fall on you or someone else. There are any number of extremely and unusually dangerous conditions existing on and around the rocks, and elsewhere on the property. We may or may not know about any specific hazard, but even if we do, don't expect us to try to warn you. You're on your own.
Inspired by Nelson Rocks, I have come up with a securities disclosure version of their disclaimer, designed to meet all of the MD&A "Risk Factors" needs of your favorite public company. It looks like this:
ITEM 1A: RISK FACTORS
Risks Related to our Business and Ownership of our Securities
Our business is unpredictable and unsafe. The stock market, including the market for our securities, is dangerous. Many books have been written about these dangers, and there's no way we can list them all here. Read the books.
The path to success for our business is littered with land mines. Seriously—anything could happen. Our competitors try their best every day to crush us, and they could succeed. We could get rich and complacent following our IPO and fail to innovate. Our customers could abandon us. Key members of our management team could quit to sail their yachts around the world for a decade. We could grow so fast that our business spirals out of control. Any or all of these could occur and our business would go down the toilet, along with your investment.
Real dangers are present even if none of the above occurs. New technologies may be developed that will render ours obsolete. A patent troll could come along who claims to own the intellectual property rights to our technology, costing us tens of millions of dollars in defense costs (best case) or destroying our entire business (worst case). Third parties such as malicious hackers could emerge to undercut our business. Even the government could torpedo us by passing new laws that hurt our business. The bottom line is that our business and the stock market are unsafe, period. Live with it or stay away.
Totally unforeseen things can happen. There could be a SARS epidemic. There could be a terrorist attack. There could be a natural disaster, such as a hurricane. A herd of elephants could escape from the zoo and trample our headquarters, squashing our business and your investment like a bug. Don't think it can't happen.
Even if none of these things happen, the stock market could go down for no reason whatsoever. That is to say, you may make a wise investment, we may work our tails off, our business may thrive, and you may still lose all of your money. It happens all the time.
If you engage in particularly dangerous trading such as uncovered options or naked short selling, you may lose everything you own. This is true whether you are experienced or not, trained or not, educated or not, or intelligent or not. It's a fact, such trading is extremely dangerous. If you don't like that, don’t do it. You really shouldn't be doing it anyway. We do not provide supervision or instruction. We are not responsible for the financial ruin that may result. As far as we know, any of these types of trades can and will fail and send you plunging to your financial death. You're on your own.
Financial bail-out services are not provided by our company. If you lose your shirt investing in our company after reading all this, don’t come running to us (or your class action lawyers). We assume no responsibility.
By investing in our business, you are agreeing that we owe you no duty of care other than not being crooks. We promise you nothing else. This is no joke. We won't even try to warn you about any dangerous or hazardous conditions not required of us by the SEC, whether we know about it or not. If we do decide to warn you about something, that doesn't mean we will try to warn you about anything else. We and our employees or agents may do things that are unwise and dangerous. In fact, we probably will. Sorry, we're not responsible. We may make bad decisions or give out mistaken guidance. Don't listen to us. In short, INVEST IN OUR COMPANY AT YOUR OWN RISK. And have fun!
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Tuesday, September 12, 2006 |
Pop Quiz
Quick--
What is the difference between the following allegations:
1. "company insiders noticed the revenue and earnings shortfall by the start of the Class Period-in very late April 2004"
and...
2. "company insiders noticed the revenue and earnings shortfall by the start of the Class Period-in very late April 2004"
The PSLRA Nugget has the answer here.
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Wednesday, August 16, 2006 |
SLW Spin Police on Alert
The SLW Spin Police have been placed on alert following this statement by Milberg Weiss in a press release from August 8, 2006:
"Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP is the most respected and effective plaintiff's law firm in the United States."
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Monday, August 7, 2006 |
Guest Post: Third Circuit Reconsiders the "Presumption of Reasonableness"
SLW guest-poster Wayne Schneider, General Counsel of the New York State Teachers' Retirement System, is back with another excellent piece on what appears to be an under-examined aspect of the Third Circuit's recent opinion in In re: AT&T Corp. Securities Litigation: is the Third Circuit backing away from the "presumption of reasonableness" it announced in the Cendant case for a fee negotiated between a lead plaintiff and class counsel?
Mr. Schneider writes:
Several years ago, the Third Circuit opined in the landmark Cendant case that a fee request of class counsel based upon counsel’s retainer agreement with the lead plaintiffs appointed pursuant to the 1995 Reform Act should enjoy a “presumption of reasonableness”. The federal securities class action plaintiffs’ bar have trotted this notion out ever since in support of their fee requests, no matter how excessive.
Mr. Schneider observes that in the cases in which his retirement system has objected to fee requests which it believed to be excessive,
class counsel has invariably trotted out the "presumption of reasonableness" as their argument of choice. Indeed, class action lawyers love the presumption because they see it as inviting a court to determine not whether they have carried their burden under the Reform Act of proving their requested fee is reasonable, and not excessive, but to determine only whether the precise objections raised by objecting parties “clearly” establish their requested fee is unreasonable. As they would have it, their requested fee must be determined to be reasonable under the “presumption” unless proven otherwise.
In the recent AT&T decision, however, Mr. Schneider sees some language that suggests to him that "perhaps securities investors can look forward to the day real soon" when the "presumption of reasonableness" notion disappears entirely.
You can read Mr. Schneider's entire post on the AT&T opinion here.
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Thursday, August 3, 2006 |
What Are We Going to Do? Yacht Trip!
Interesting article in the New York Observer about a lavish yacht trip last Friday night aboard the 160-foot-long Duchess, which cast off from a dock along the Hudson River at 41st Street in New York. The passengers aboard this yacht? None other than the lawyers of recently-indicted law firm Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman. Read the whole article for a good account of where things stand now for the Milberg Weiss firm and its steadily declining number of lawyers.
And I must ask--does this unlikely yacht trip and its surrounding circumstances remind anyone else A LOT of a certain scene from a movie? How about this one?
HOOVER: Ladies and gentlemen, l'll be brief. The issue here is not whether we broke a few rules or took a few liberties with our female party guests. We did.
But you can't hold a whole fraternity responsible for the behaviour of a few sick, perverted individuals. If you do shouldn't we blame the whole fraternity system? And if the whole fraternity system is guilty, then isn't this an indictment of our educational institutions in general?
I put it to you, Greg. Isn't this an indictment of our entire American society?
Well, you can do what you want to us. But we won't sit here and listen to you badmouth the United States of America! Gentlemen!
WORMER: You're not walking out on this one, mister. You're finished. No more Delta! You've bought it this time, buster! I''m calling your national office! I'm going to revoke your charter! If you wise guys try one more thing, one more, l'll kick you out of this college! No more fun of any kind!
***
BOON: Jesus. What's going on?
BLUTARSKY: They confiscated everything, even the stuff we didn't steal. They took the bar! The whole @#&$# bar!
BOON: This is ridiculous. What are we going to do?
BLUTARSKY: Yacht Trip! Road trip!
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Friday, July 21, 2006 |
Welcome to "The D&O Diary"
A belated "welcome to the blogosphere" to The D&O Diary, a relatively new blog that since May 2006 has been posting "items of interest from the world of Directors and Officers Liability, with occasional commentary."
One item that D&O Diary has been following closely recently is securities class actions and derivative actions concerning options backdating. In this post on the subject, D&O Diary's Kevin LaCroix states:
While The D & O Diary would prefer it if somebody else would do the work, The D & O Diary is also a firm believer that sometimes one just has to do what needs to be done if nobody else will do it. So as a public service, The D & O Diary hereby commits to maintain and update on this blog post a running tally of all the companies that have been sued based upon options timing allegations.
SLW can't help you on the derivative side of this request, but seeing how my company (ISS' Securities Class Action Services) already has a team of people researching securities class actions 24X7, we hereby volunteer to take the tracking of options backdating securities class actions off your plate. In a follow-up post, I will list the cases known to date, a list that will be updated regularly.
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Tuesday, July 18, 2006 |
File Those Claims or Else, Part VI
The SEC announced yesterday that the court overseeing its case against Time Warner has approved the Commission's plan to distribute to injured investors the $300 million paid by Time Warner Inc. The distribution plan is, as is often the case lately, for the money to be dumped into the separate Time Warner securities class action settlement pool, and disbursed by the claims administrator in that case. For more on this growing (and SLW-approved) practice, see this post and the many others linked to in it.
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Friday, July 7, 2006 |
Milberg Weiss: Professional Plaintiffs "Good for the System"
Responding to a National Law Journal editorial by Prof. John Coffee that, among other things, apparently took Milberg Weiss to task for using "professional plaintiffs" who had reportedly been the "named plaintiff in at least 500 or more cases," counsel for Milberg Weiss states in this piece that such plaintiffs are actually "good for the system."
Milberg's counsel writes that:
repeat plaintiffs are more than just a fact of life. They are good for the system. This was recognized earlier this year by the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Writing for a unanimous panel in Murray v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 434 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2006), Judge Frank Easterbrook categorically rejected the notion that such "professional" plaintiffs are problematic:
"What the district judge did not explain . . . is why 'professional' is a dirty word. It implies experience, if not expertise. The district judge did not cite a single decision supporting the proposition that someone whose rights have been violated by 50 different persons may sue only a subset of the offenders. Neither does GMACM." Id. at 954. And neither, with all due respect, does Professor Coffee.
Yeah, that's the ticket! "Experience!" "Expertise!"
Um, are you kidding me?!
And by the way, take a look at the GMAC case cited above. The plaintiff is woman who, shortly after her debts had been discharged in bankruptcy, received dozens of credit solicitations from GMAC Mortgage and others who allegedly accessed her credit without her consent and without meeting certain statutory requirements. As the court noted, she "did not accept compensation to put herself in the way of injury." Rather, the court said, she just "opened the mail as it arrived."
In the paragraph immediately following the one quoted by Milberg's counsel above, the GMAC court then specifically differentiated her situation from that of a professional plaintiff in the securities context:
A person who seeks out opportunities to sue could do so in ways that injure other class members. Consider the investor who buys one share in each of a thousand corporations, hoping that the price of one will plummet and lead to securities litigation. Such a person could be tempted to file suits designed to extract payoffs from the corporation even if the average investor will lose in the process. Congress has responded by insisting that the investors with the largest stakes be allowed to control securities litigation.
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Tuesday, June 13, 2006 |
The Trifecta
As stated in this press release last week by the SEC, the disbursement of $750 million to Bristol-Myers Squibb shareholders began on Thursday, June 8. This $750 million includes (1) $150 million BMS paid to settle the SEC's case against it, (2) $300 million BMS paid to settle a related securities class action, and (3) $300 million BMS paid in a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office in New Jersey to address the company's criminal liability. The combined $750 million in funds from the SEC case, civil action and criminal case is being distributed all at once to shareholders who filed a claim last year with the claims administrator--The Garden City Group--in the BMS securities class action settlement.
As a result, we have what I believe to be the first claims filing "trifecta"--civil, SEC and criminal settlement money all rolled into one giant distribution. Shareholders who filed a timely proof of claim in the BMS securities class action settlement will actually receive a share of $750 million, not just the $300 million from the civil settlement. Conversely, shareholders who fail to file a claim in the BMS civil settlement miss out on the money from that settlement, as well as the additional $450 million from the SEC and criminal settlements.
The moral of the story, as usual: File those claims.
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Thursday, June 8, 2006 |
Guest Post: "The Quiet Revolution in Attorneys' Fee Requests"
Wayne Schneider, General Counsel for the New York State Teachers' Retirement System, is back with another thoughtful guest post entitled "The Quiet Revolution in Attorneys’ Fee Requests in Federal Securities Class Actions - Why Isn’t It Less Quiet?" (His first guest post on a related topic is available here).
Mr. Schneider observes that public sector pension plans have worked hard to significantly reduce attorney fees in recent cases such as AOL Time Warner (7% ); Royal Ahold (15%); McKesson HBOC (7.8%); Raytheon (9%); and Waste Management (7.93%). Accordingly, Mr. Schneider asks and sets out to answer the following question:
Although these fee requests, as a percentage of the settlement amounts, are astonishingly low compared to the typical fee requests in the days before the enactment of the Reform Act, why haven’t the successful efforts of public sector funds in reducing class action fees received greater attention and galvanized greater interest in seeing lower fee awards in the numerous cases in which public sector plans are not serving as lead plaintiffs?
The full post is available here.
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Friday, March 31, 2006 |
Not the Path to Riches
This just in: The AP reports that "Shareholder Suits Not Path to Riches" for investors.
In other breaking news, SLW reports that spending $1,000 on a television in order to get the $100 mail-in rebate is not the path to riches. Nor is trading your $10 bill for your friend's $1 bill.
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Thursday, March 23, 2006 |
Back on Top
Less than one year after being skewered by the WSJ in an article entitled "J.P. Morgan's $630 Million Error" that questioned his judgment and litigation strategy in the WorldCom case, Skadden attorney Jay Kasner is back on top--he argued and recently won the high-profile Dabit case for Merrill Lynch (discussed in detail here by The 10b-5 Daily) in the U.S. Supreme Court. Kasner is still apparently on speaking terms with the WSJ, or at least the WSJ Law Blog. In this post on the Law Blog, Kasner is quoted after his victory as stating:
One effect of the court’s decision will be that public companies will be able to access the U.S. capital markets without fear of securities class action litigation in 50 different states with 50 potentially different set of applicable laws.
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Tuesday, February 28, 2006 |
The Money Lawyers, by Joseph C. Goulden: Excerpt #4
Our fourth (and final) excerpt below from The Money Lawyers, by Joseph C. Goulden, sheds light on the behind the scenes wrangling that occurred between the plaintiffs' bar and President Clinton with respect to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. As described by the author, Lerach played the "Nader card" to persuade Clinton to follow through on an early promise to veto what had in the end become a "veto proof" bill.
Excerpt #4 from The Money Lawyers
Chapter: "Lerach and Weiss: The Class Action Scourges of the West and East"
by Joseph C. Goulden
But even as the reform act moved through Congress, the plaintiff lawyers retained a powerful ally: President Bill Clinton. They gave him millions of dollars of campaign money; he passed himself off as their friend. During the summer and early autumn of 1995 he sent them repeated signals, Don't worry, I'll veto it and make them come back with something you can live with. I am your friend.
But was the President serious? The act finally passed with so-called "veto-proof" margins in both houses. So all sides began a tedious game of Clinton-watching: would he sign, or would he veto? What few persons appreciated was the deep, if ambivalent, relationship between Lerach and Clinton.
Lerach to Clinton: "Veto -- or Else!"
Bill Lerach and I had our first in-depth talk in September 1998, the very week that seamy details emerged of Clinton's adulterous affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Lerach interrupted to take a phone call from his wife. In sotto voce murmurs he seemed to be trying to soothe some ruffled feelings.
After he hung up, he volunteered an explanation. The Lerachs were hosting a fund-raising event featuring President Clinton the following weekend. Given that Lerach has two beautiful daughters within Lewinsky's age range, the women of the house were not enthralled at entertaining a guest involved in outrageous philandering. Mrs. Lerach (the third woman to carry that title; she has since been replaced by the fourth) was upset also because she had just overseen an expensive decorating job, and the Secret Service detail wanted some things moved around. But Lerach was going ahead with the fundraiser anyway.
Lerach was typical of the Clinton supporters who during this troubling period were manually skilled enough to hold their noses and write checks at the same time. He found the President's sexual misconduct "reprehensible...unforgivable...a damned dumb thing." Without breaking verbal stride, he went on to say that he admired the President anyway because of their similar up-from-nothing backgrounds to success in their respective fields. (*)
(*) Mel Weiss is also a political friend of Clinton. In 1997, The National Law Journal surveyed White House coffee and overnight visitor lists to see how many lawyers partook of Clinton hospitality. High on the list was Mel Weiss, who gave $224,000 to the Democrats in the 1995-1996 election cycle, $200,000 of which earmarked for the Clinton-Gore campaign.
Given that he had personally donated hundreds of thousands of dollars to Clinton and other Democratic candidates over the years, and led efforts that brought in millions more, in the autumn of 1995 Lerach was ready to demand a quid pro quo. He wanted a promise from Clinton that he would veto the PSLRA. Clinton wavered. He talked about the "veto-proof" vote. Why should he squander political capital in a losing fight? Lerach sensed that his supposed friend was wavering. And what he did can be interpreted as either (a) an attempt to persuade Clinton to stand by his stated intentions or (b) crass political extortion.
Whatever Lerach's motive, the central figure became Ralph Nader, who has long been a close friend and financial beneficiary of Lerach. Nader had long helped the plaintiff lawyers in their earlier fights against changes in securities laws. Now he (and Lerach) saw a means of bringing the President back in line. Along with other leftists, Nader that fall was increasingly disgusted with Clinton's centrist policies and his repeated betrayal of promises to persons who had helped him win election. Nader had already made public sounds about mounting a symbolic challenge to Clinton in the California Democratic primary the next spring. No one gave him a chance of winning. But Nader could embarrass Clinton into moving left and force him to spend dollars that he preferred to save for the general election. Lerach put the threat directly to the President, either during or just after a White House dinner that fall.
Lerach absolutely refuses to discuss what transpired between him and Clinton, or what he told the President. But the gist of his message was that either Clinton vetoed the reform act, or Lerach would give Nader enough money to make a serious run in the primary.
And Clinton capitulated. He vetoed the act, citing technical objections intelligible only to securities lawyers.
Critics immediately jumped on Clinton for "selling out" to the plaintiffs' bar; Forbes Magazine, among other publications, noted that Lerach "had dinner at the White House" a few nights before the veto. Indeed he did, Lerach said -- along with about 400 other persons, including the chief executive of a Big Six accounting firm who supported the legislation. "Big deal, huh?" he scoffed.
The episode stands a vivid example of the power of money in American politics, and how a rich plaintiff lawyer can bully even a President of the United States.
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Friday, February 24, 2006 |
File Those Claims or Else, Part V
The SEC today provided the latest reminder to institutional investors of the importance of filing claims in securities class action settlements by proposing to dump the funds from its $250 million settlement with Qwest into the separate Qwest securities class action settlement pool. You can see my longer post on the subject over at the ISS Corporate Governance Blog. (You also can travel back through Parts I-IV of this series by starting here).
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Wednesday, February 22, 2006 |
The Money Lawyers, by Joseph C. Goulden: Excerpt #3
Excerpt #3 below from The Money Lawyers, by Joseph C. Goulden, provides some interesting operational and financial details on the now-divided Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach law firm. Probably not coincidentally, the income figures stated in the book (which are based on information revealed in 1999 litigation involving the firm) peak just before the effective date of the PSLRA (a.k.a. "Kill Bill Vol. 1").
Excerpt #3 from The Money Lawyers
Chapter: "Lerach and Weiss: The Class Action Scourges of the West and East"
by Joseph C. Goulden
Lerach argues that very structure of biotech and high-tech companies makes them vulnerable to lawsuits. In his view, "A small growing biotech company cannot pay its president the salary that General Motors or IBM pays their top person. In fact, a lot of the compensation for the executives is stock-option based, where the executives are going to exercise their stock options every quarter and sell the stock. This puts tremendous pressure on those executives in the short term to keep the stock price up because they know, as a matter of their ongoing compensation, that they are going to exercise options and sell stock. "And, looking at it from the most favorable light, it is just a bad matrix. The compensation system puts pressure on them to put out positive news and conceal bad news because of that."
Aligning himself with Weiss also gave Lerach something he felt essential to a successful practice. "Call it what you like, but I like the term 'f*** you money,' which means a bankroll big enough to carry you when a suit drags for two or three years and does not provide a dime of income. Mel was doing well enough in New York, with his own stuff, that he could put up the capital I needed to get started. You can be smarter than anyone in the world, but unless you have enough money to keep a suit alive, you have nothing. You either lose, or you are forced to settle on the cheap to survive." Given the pool of capital initially supplied by Weiss, "the defense attorneys gradually learned that we were here to stay, and that they could not grind us down."
Now, of course, Lerach has money in his own right -- enough to support nearly 100 lawyers spread over three floors of the First American Center. (Weiss heads a New York office with 75 partners and almost a hundred associates. There are outposts in San Francisco and Florida. There are also researchers, investigators (both staff and contractors), enough computer nerds to staff a high-tech company, and specialists who do nothing else but keep track of the enormous flow of paper that sloshes around the office. (I asked Lerach how much money it cost a year to keep his operation going. He answered with a grin that said such information was none of my business. Nor would he or Mel Weiss tell me what they earned annually.)*
(*) Lerach made the same refusal in Congressional hearings in 1995. He told Representative Christopher Cox (R., Calif.), "You know, my mother told me when I was growing up, the most impolite question you could ever ask another person was how much money they make…. I don't ask other people what they make and I don't tell other people what I make." Cox noted that since Lerach reported $255,000 in political contributions in 1994, "I guess you made more than that."
In 1999 litigation in Chicago, however, the closely guarded figures about Milberg Weiss income came out of the closet. Here they are:
Year Weiss Lerach Firm Profits (In millions)
1988 2.6 2.3 20.8
1989 7.1 6.5 35.4
1990 3.4 3.2 19.8
1991 5.8 5.8 33.4
1992 9.7 9.3 46.4
1993 14.1 13.6 85.5
1994 13.0 16.0 101.2
1995 16.1 15.0 112.3
1996 9.4 9.1 63.3
1997 7.6 7.6 61.1
1998 13.6 13.6 91.0
But investment in non-lawyer staff is essential to the firm's success, in Lerach's view. "Let me tell you why investigators are important," he said. "We're working on a potential case right now involving [a clothing firm on the West Coast]. At about the same time their stock began to go into the tank, the trade press carried an item saying that a 48-year-old executive who had been with the company for 21 years had resigned 'to spend more time with his family,' which is one of the euphemisms that always catch my eye.
"So we had an investigator see what she could find out by talking to employees on the Internet. She found a chat site for people who worked for the company, and she hit pay dirt in a hurry. The owner had a 29-year-old daughter, a high school graduate who had worked as a model, never got out of college, and who had never had a real job. She was suddenly made the president, and she didn't have an idea of what she was doing, and other employees were mad as hell. These people in the Internet chat rooms told her the whole story. Yeah, this research is expensive, and you hit some dry holes. But you've got to scratch for information." (Sure enough, several weeks later Lerach sued the company on grounds that it had not sufficiently informed shareholders of its earnings prospects and caliber of management.)
Lerach made plain that he runs a law firm, not a training school. He does the hiring for the San Diego office, and he does not cater to just-graduated rookies. "Your slip-and-fall case, your fender-bender, that's a few thousand bucks. Very little comes through the door here that isn't worth more than a million dollars. So you don't turn amateurs loose on that kind of playing field; there is too much money at stake, and investors who really need to get it back." He looks for persons with extensive trial or investigative experience, and he keeps a close eye on them through their first cases. He especially likes former Federal prosecutors. One associate who left the firm told me that although he "worked my living butt off, almost 3,000 hours a year," he felt the experience of working with Lerach was "incomparable." Other associate, still at the firm, complained of being "late Friday bone-tired, and a weekend of work ahead of me." He was looking for another job.
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Tuesday, February 21, 2006 |
Webcast on Non-U.S. Securities Class Actions: Replay Now Available
A complete replay of our webcast last week entitled "Securities Class Action Litigation Moves Beyond U.S. Borders" is now available here. It contains some very useful (and to my knowledge otherwise unavailable) information and commentary on the latest securities class action developments in Italy, South Korea, Australia, Israel, Sweden, The Netherlands, Canada and Germany.
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Friday, February 17, 2006 |
The Money Lawyers, by Joseph C. Goulden: Excerpt #2
Below is the second in a series of excerpts we will post at SLW from the new book The Money Lawyers, by Joseph C. Goulden. In this excerpt, Lerach is explaining to the author "how it all started"--how although he had "defiantly written on his law school application that he did not intend to spend his life 'in a nine to five job,'" he started out doing just that by his choice for his first job with the big Pittsburgh firm of Reed Smith Shaw & McClay (at a then-"fantastic" $17,000 a year). Lerach then explains to the author some realities he learned about the profession of law, and how he eventually met up with his future partner, Mel Weiss.
Excerpt #2 from The Money Lawyers
Chapter: "Lerach and Weiss: The Class Action Scourges of the West and East"
by Joseph C. Goulden
First, by Lerach's observation, many lawyers at Reed Smith cared nothing about the merits of a client's case. Even when the defendant corporation was wrong, they worked hard to get it out of trouble. He believed his fellow corporate lawyers could deflect discovery of evidence, often skirting close to flaunting the canons of ethics. Time and again he would hear colleagues joke about the strength of a plaintiff's case, and how they intended to win anyway. "I would find myself thinking, 'the poor bastard, if he only knew what he really had going for him.' Our clients knew they had done something wrong; we won by wearing them down." A local judiciary friendly to corporate interests helped.
Second, Lerach realized the raw power of resources. Reed Smith, with its deep pockets and well-paid lawyers, simply wore down and outlasted plaintiffs. "This was a very important lesson to me," Lerach says. "I knew that if I ever found myself on the other side, I was going to need money -- a helluva' lot of money."
But Lerach learned his way around the courtroom. His unhappy speciality was what he called "worms in the can of corn cases," which he defended on behalf of a food canners association. Lerach lived in a milieu of gray flannel suits and button-down collars, and he was so good at what he did that he soon was on the path towards a partnership.
Lerach even dabbled in securities law -- but on the side of corporations who came under attack by dissident shareholders. In 1972, Lerach co-authored an article in the University of Pittsburgh Law Review that later foes would cite with glee and accusation of hypocrisy. Lerach called class actions "procedural monstrosities" and argued in favor of requiring that pleadings be made with "great particularity" to prevent abuses by unscrupulous plaintiff attorneys. He noted that while such changes would be "a departure from the Federal principle of notice pleadings, the serious problem of the abuse of the class action justifies such innovations." Lerach went on to complain about strike suits, which he defined as "claims brought to coerce defendants into a settlement without regard for the merit of the action. Such suits are brought with the hope of obtaining large attorney's fees or private settlements with no intention of benefiting those on whose behalf the suit was theoretically brought." And, he wrote, the mere threat of a class action is useful to plaintiff attorneys "as a bargaining weapon." A decade later, defense lawyers would voice the same criticisms of Lerach suits.
Despite his success at Reed Smith, dissatisfaction tugged at Lerach. Did he really want to spend the rest of his life defending corporate poohbahs, many of whom he thought were incompetent businessman -- and liars as well? Frequently he would feel that the very men with whom he worked knew they were helping conceal corporate wrongdoing, but seemed totally unmoved by conscience. Lerach gulped unhappily and went along with the system and enjoyed the money. Then along came a case that dramatically changed Lerach's life.
"A trust department in one of the Mellon banks had invested about $7 million in a San Diego outfit named U. S. Financial which turned out to be a scam. Now the Mellon bank had zero interest in suing anybody; their mentality was that you didn't settle differences in court. Bankers who sued other people were considered undignified. But in this case, Mellon had no choice because trust money was involved. So it told Reed Smith to go after its $7 million, as part of a class action suit on behalf of other people U. S. Financial had screwed. The firm looked around and said, 'OK, Lerach, you are the firebrand, you handle this case.' I went out to Denver for a meeting of the lawyers who were handling the case."
So one evening in 1975 Lerach rode the elevator up to the presidential suite of the storied Brown Palace Hotel for a meeting of the various lawyers. Presiding was an intense New Yorker with a dense dark beard named Melvyn Weiss, who was emerging as the dean of the small group of lawyers who specialized in suits on behalf of bilked investors. A number of plaintiffs had joined the U. S. Financial suit, and the Denver meeting was to determine who would control the class action into which all the cases were folded.
Weiss explained what the case was all about. U. S. Financial was a self-contained real estate company which "left nothing to chance. It operated its own mortgage company, title insurance company and brokerage business. It built its own product by entering into joint ventures to build, providing all or most of the financing. It also sold most of its real estate to affiliated parties." As Weiss said, the suit "alleged that this company entered into transactions with its affiliates on the last day of every reporting period, thereby creating virtually all of the profit for the entire reporting period. In those situations, U. S. Financial was advancing the money to the buyers to make their down payments. [T]he transactions had no real economic substance." The churning resulted in millions of dollars being drained from the pockets of investors.
Lerach was impressed. "Mel sat there like the complete master of the universe. He was barking orders right and left, saying which lawyer would do what, laying out the scenario for what would happen in court the next day. He was in complete charge, and all of us sat there saying, 'Yes, Mel, you're right, whatever you want....' Man, I was impressed. Mel was the smartest lawyer I had ever seen. I was used to dealing with the uptight, stuffy defense lawyers. Now I was definitely on the other side of the spectrum."
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Wednesday, February 15, 2006 |
The Money Lawyers, by Joseph C. Goulden
A new book by Joseph C. Goulden called The Money Lawyers contains a very interesting and insightful chapter that examines the history and exploits of Bill Lerach, Mel Weiss and the now-divided Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach law firm. This chapter of the book entitled "Lerach and Weiss: The Class Action Scourges of the West and East," focuses primarily on Lerach, and is based on Goulden's personal interviews with Lerach and many other individuals (the book also scrutinizes David Boies, Tommy Boggs, the lawyers involved in the breast implant litigation, and several other "Money Lawyers"). I finished reading this chapter last night, and feel like I learned a lot about Lerach and Weiss, both flattering and unflattering.
Thanks to Mr. Goulden, Securities Litigation Watch will over the coming weeks be posting excerpts of the Lerach/Weiss chapter of The Money Lawyers, starting today. To kick things off, here is the opening salvo of this chapter:
Lerach and Weiss: The Class Action Scourges of the West and East
William S. Lerach and Melvyn Weiss
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach
San Diego and New York City
by Joseph C. Goulden
My letter to William S. Lerach was candid. I wrote that I had read many nasty things about him in the press, and, especially in publications whose constituency is the high-tech companies of the Silicon Valley -- firms which had surrendered billions of dollars to him and his firm in class action securities suits over the years. I cited one particularly unkind item, a headline in Electrosphere that called him a "Bloodsucking Scumbag." That was just the headline; the text got worse. In any event, surely there must be another side of the story. Could we talk?
One meets "the most hated man in the Silicon Valley" -- another trade publication's depiction -- by riding an elevator to the 18th floor of the One America Plaza Building in downtown San Diego, hard by the harbor. Yachts and powerboats bob at anchor, backdropped by a view that seemingly stretches most of the way to Asia. The electric railroad terminal is a block distant, and the clang of car bells drifts up from the street. The visitors' room at Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach is separated from the reception area by an L-shaped tank containing dozens of garishly bright tropical fish that flash through the water.
Seeing the fish reminded me of what a defense lawyer snarled as he left the Milberg Weiss offices one evening after name-calling negotiations: "It would be a hell of a lot more appropriate if Lerach would get rid of those cute little pets and fill the tank with piranha. Or sharks."
Enter Lerach, at the hurried pace I have learned to associate with busy lawyers, his pumping arms seemingly trying to coax more speed from his feet. He was dressed...well, let me say it this way: Lerach was dressed unlike any big city trial lawyer I have encountered on a working day, a study in casual white, from cotton shirt to cotton slacks, the monochrome broken only by the brown of his Topsiders. I asked later whether this is "dress down Friday." Lerach seemed puzzled, then he laughed. "No, no," he says, "remember, this is San Diego!" The Washington patent lawyer Bernard Meany had chuckled earlier when he told me of his first visit to Milberg Weiss as an expert witness. The receptionist, a "rather buxom woman, who stood about 38 across the top," was wearing a skimpy halter.
Lerach is a stocky fellow in his mid-fifties, his hair (also well on the way to being white) swept up in what seems an Afro slightly modified by a barber from the styling school who developed former President Clinton's distinctive tonsorial style. I had been warned to expect a man of temper, one who loses control of his tongue when talking about opposing attorneys and the high-tech executives they represent.
Stories of the temper are legion. An unfriendly adversary told me he once heard Lerach tell corporate executives during negotiations, "I don't give a f*** if I put your company into bankruptcy. I'm going to take away your beach house and your condo in Aspen by the time I'm finished with you." When he talks about high tech executives, he tosses around vitriol such as "scumbags" and "crime in the suites." He can be combative when dealing with other lawyers. One remembers hearing Lerach storm, "Your professional life is at an end. I am going to destroy you."
But he chose to open our talk with a grin. "So," he said, "some of those guys are saying nasty things about me, eh?"
Indeed they were, for Lerach and his firm are specialists in a type of class action lawsuit that bedeviled officers and directors of publicly held companies for more than twenty years. Lerach's reasoning is simple. If he feels that companies deceived investors with misleading statements, and insiders dump their stock before the truth emerges and the price drops, he sues them. More than a thousand times, Milberg Weiss lawyers have marched into state and Federal court and accused executives of chicanery. And often they have marched out again with settlements or verdicts including contingency fees totaling in the billion-dollar range over the years, leaving corporate bosses seething in their wake. Since the firm’s founding 35 years ago, it claims to have been “responsible for more than $30 billion in aggregate recoveries.” Profits for the firm twice topped $100 million a year during the 1990s.
Milberg Weiss handles more than half of all private securities litigation cases filed in the United States each year. The year 2000 was not untypical. Of the 204 shareholder class actions filed that year, 149, or 73 percent, came from Milberg Weiss, according to statistics kept by Woodruff-Sawyer & Company, an insurance broker specializing in liability policies for corporate directors and officers. In the five years ending in 2000, according to Lerach's accounting, he and his team gained almost $12 billion in court judgments and settlements. Most are the latter; only about five percent of Milberg Weiss cases actually go to a jury trial. (According to the Federal Judicial Center, roughly the same percentage of all Federal civil cases is decided by a jury.)
Lerach considers himself a private regulatory policeman, doing the job that the Securities and Exchange Commission cannot or will not do. He speaks scornfully of the lackadaisical attitude the SEC has taken towards securities cheats since the Reagan Administration, and continuing during the reign of President Bill Clinton -- a man he considered to be a friend, and for whom he raised hundreds of thousands of dollars from fellow trial lawyers.*
* Reflecting after I spoke with Lerach, I realized perhaps why he continued his friendship with Clinton even while deriding his attitude towards a vigorous SEC. If the SEC did its job as Lerach says it should, he and colleagues could suffer a near-terminal blow to their pocketbooks.
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Monday, February 6, 2006 |
Refco Lead Plaintiff/Counsel Appointed
Bloomberg reported on Friday, February 3 that the U.S. District Court for the SDNY appointed asset manager PIMCO and RH Capital Associates as lead plaintiffs in the securities class action lawsuit against Refco's underwriters and directors. Twelve shareholders reportedly filed motions to be appointed lead plaintiff, in what was a hotly-contested battle for control of the case. The court also confirmed the firms' choice of lawyers -- the law firms Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann and Grant & Eisenhofer -- as lead counsel in the case.
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Friday, February 3, 2006 |
Enough Already With The "Sharp Decline"
Based on the recent Stanford/Cornerstone report (discussed here), the NY Times and the WSJ Law Blog are now asserting and ruminating upon the meaning of the "sharp decline in the overall number of securities fraud class actions" in 2005. It is amazing to me how many people have now written essentially the same, incorrect, thing based on the shall we say "imprecise" press release that accompanied the report. According to Stanford's Prof. Grundfest himself, the noteworthy finding of the report was the significant decline in total market capitalization losses, not the insignificant decline in the number of cases filed.
Let me say this one final time, after which I'll stop because (a) no one is listening to me anyway, and (b) the geek-factor of this "debate" is off-the-meter: nobody believes that there was a "significant" or "sharp" or "steep" decline in securities class actions last year. That includes nobody from Stanford or Cornerstone, I believe.
Please look at the chart below from page 3 of the report. The number of filings goes up and the number goes down, within a very narrow range. Did it go down slightly in 2005? Yes. Does the slight decline in 2005 look just like the slight declines in 1999, 2001, 2003? You tell me.
The next person who writes about the sharp decline in 2005 is On Notice. I mean it.
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Wednesday, February 1, 2006 |
A Discussion With Professor Elliott Weiss
The following appears in the February 2006 SCAS Alert:
A Discussion With Professor Elliott Weiss
By Bruce Carton, Vice President, ISS' Securities Class Action Services
In late December, leading plaintiffs’ securities class action law firm Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP announced that Elliott Weiss, a prominent professor and securities law expert, had left academia to join BLBG. This announcement intrigued and somewhat puzzled many lawyers and others in the industry, who viewed Professor Weiss as a harsh, long-time critic of class action abuse and waste by plaintiffs’ law firms. This reaction in turn puzzled Professor Weiss, who states that he is not at all hostile to class actions in general, and that his criticisms have been “directed at suits that have no merit and lawyers who exploit the process, neither of which advance investors' interests.”
I interviewed Professor Weiss about his move from academia to private practice, as well as several other subjects.
Carton: Your 1995 article, "Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions" {104 Yale L.J. 2053 (1995)}, proposed reforms for the organization of securities class actions, and was the basis of the lead plaintiff provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995. You have been a long-time critic of class action abuse and certain practices of the plaintiffs' bar. What led you to join a plaintiffs' law firm and, specifically, BLBG?
Weiss: After I retired from the faculty of the Rogers College of Law at the University of Arizona, I decided that I would like to remain active professionally. I also was interested in developing an ongoing relationship with a law firm. I had had several good experiences working with BLBG in the past, including, most recently, working on the brief on defendants' Rule 23(f) appeal to the Fifth Circuit of the class certification decision in the EDS litigation. The BLBG lawyers impressed me with their professionalism and their commitment to effectively representing their clients. I also was impressed by the results they had achieved in cases such as Baptist Foundation, Cendant and WorldCom, among others. We began discussing a possible relationship and things worked out.
Carton: Have the PSLRA's lead plaintiff provisions worked the way you envisioned?
Weiss: Not exactly. When we wrote our article, the Internet was in its infancy. We anticipated that most communications between law firms and investors would be face-to-face. The explosive growth of the Internet created a very different dynamic. However, especially in big cases where major institutional investors have served as lead plaintiffs, they have worked pretty much as we hoped they would. Recoveries are in a whole different league than was the case before the PSLRA was adopted and are much more reflective of the merits of the claims being litigated. Attorneys’ fees are a much lower percentage of recoveries and reflect real bargaining between institutions and their lawyers. And, in at least a few cases, institutional investors have pushed for and obtained recoveries payable out of the pockets of corporate officers and directors, which has a potential major deterrent effect, but was not anything plaintiffs' lawyers were inclined to seek before institutional investors entered the picture.
Carton: What role will you serve with BLBG? Do you expect to actively litigate cases? To serve as an expert behind the scenes? Something else?
Weiss: My role at BLBG is still evolving. The relationship is very much a part-time one. I expect to be--and already have been-- involved in cases that the firm is actively litigating, but I do not anticipate assuming a lead counsel role. My guess is that I'll be more like an in-house consultant.
Carton: In May 2000, you filed a declaration in the Cendant case opposing the BLBG fee request to the extent it short-cut the "Lead Plaintiff's rightful participation in the process of formulating a request for attorneys' fees." What were the circumstances that led you to do so, and what are the lessons that can be taken from the Cendant case with respect to attorneys' fees?
Weiss: In Cendant, I filed a declaration as an expert retained by the New York City Pension Funds, which were one of three lead plaintiffs. The thrust of my declaration was that the district court should have deferred to the fee arrangement negotiated by lead plaintiffs, rather than taking over the fee-setting process. The fee agreement required lead counsel to obtain the approval of lead plaintiffs before submitting their fee request. I argued that the district court should require them to seek that approval before passing on counsel's fee request. That's almost exactly how the Third Circuit eventually ordered the district court to proceed. The lessons from that case seem self-evident.
Carton: What changes, reforms, or other shifts do you foresee in the securities class action process in the next five years? Ten years?
Weiss: I'm not sure my crystal ball is any better than that of anyone else. My impression is that courts have gotten more comfortable and more sophisticated when dealing with the lead plaintiff appointment process. For example, they're no longer appointing large "groups" of unrelated investors to serve as lead plaintiffs, which was a process that pretty much left control of the case in the hands of the lawyers who assembled those groups. I think we will see a steady evolution in that area. I also think courts will get better at using the pleading provisions of the PSLRA to winnow out those complaints that should be dismissed and to sustain those that address real instances of fraud.
Carton: What are you most excited about with respect to your new position in private practice?
Weiss: The opportunity to work with a group of smart, committed lawyers and the opportunity to seek meaningful remedies for investors who have been injured by fraud. I have always believed that the plaintiffs' bar can, and often does, play a very important, constructive role in our capital markets. In fact, in our article proposing the lead plaintiff process, we pointed out the flaws in work by Janet Cooper Alexander and others who suggested that the merits never matter in securities class action litigation. My goal as an academic was always to suggest ways to improve the manner in which the plaintiffs' bar can protect investors' interests. I'm excited to have the opportunity to become a more direct part of that process.
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Wednesday, January 25, 2006 |
Payback Time
U.S. News has this article entitled "It's Payback Time" about the challenges facing investors who wish to recover in securities class action settlements. Referring to the massive, upcoming Enron settlement, the article quotes yours truly, as follows:
And there's still plenty of time to gather records to apply for some of the $7 billion set aside to repay Enron investors. That fund hasn't even started accepting applications yet. But get started soon, because collecting from the funds will take more effort than many investors spent deciding to buy the highflying stocks in the first place. Investors with mutual funds, even those in 401(k)'s or individual retirement accounts, should call their fund managers and remind them to collect what they are owed, says Bruce Carton, who runs an Institutional Shareholder Services division that helps firms get reimbursed.
In 2006, it is hard to believe that any mutual fund would still be leaving settlement money on the table (likely harming its own NAV in the process). But with recent studies showing that as many as 70% of institutions fail to file such claims, that is almost certainly the case.
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Tuesday, January 24, 2006 |
New Wave of Securities Class Action Lawsuits on the Way?
The Boston Business Journal has this article related to the recent Stanford/Cornerstone report, as well as SLW's recent posts about the subject. The article states that:
The number of securities class action lawsuits filed in the United States fell off last year, but experts say it's not time for companies to relax yet because a rising number of corporate restatements could harbinger a new wave of such suits.
Quoting yours truly, the article adds:
But rising earnings restatements foreshadow future lawsuits, said Bruce Carton, vice president of securities class action services at Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. of Rockville, Md.
"The fact that you're getting a flurry of restatement of 2005, if it hasn't already led to lawsuits, probably will in the future," Carton said.
***
"SOX fuels restatements, which fuels lawsuits," Carton said.
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Monday, January 23, 2006 |
A Safe Bet
As discussed here by the WSJ Law Blog and in the underlying story in The Economist, an astounding number of institutional investors continue to fail to file claims in securities class action settlements--up to 70% according to one academic study. The Law Blog observes that "the Economist amusingly suggests this could lead to a new wave of class actions" against the institutional investors that are failing to collect this money.
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Thursday, January 19, 2006 |
Where Corporate Scandals are Good for Business
Newsday has a rare article about one of the key components of class action settlements: the claims administrator. The article begins by noting that
At Melville-based GCG Inc. [formerly called Garden City Group], corporate scandals can be good business.
The company is one of the largest administrators of class-action lawsuits, with about half of its business coming from securities litigation, said GCG president David Isaac.
Indeed, according to the SCAS database, as of the beginning of the 4th quarter of 2005, GCG had served as a claims administrator in no fewer than five of the top ten securities class actions since the passage of the Reform Act (WorldCom, Enron, Lucent, Dynegy and Global Crossing).
The article states that although GCG hasn't released financial figures for 2005, 2004 revenue was $86.4 million in 2004, a 15.9 percent jump from 2003.
The article also adds that according to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the number of class action lawsuits filed in federal courts reached 2,693 in 2004. As there were approximately 213 separate federal securities class actions filed in 2004, this means that at least 8% of all class actions filed were securities cases. However, most of these 213 securities actions saw multiple and sometimes dozens of securities class action complaints filed, which were later consolidated into one case. It is unclear whether these "multiple lawsuit" cases are counted separately or as one case by the Administrative Office.
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Friday, January 6, 2006 |
The Ocean Comes In, the Ocean Goes Out
I received a very kind call from Prof. Joseph Grundfest of Stanford clarifying that with respect to the Stanford/Cornerstone report discussed here, his comment that the "pig may have moved through the python" was related to the report's finding that total market capitalization losses and "dollar disclosure losses" decreased significantly from 2004. He believes that this is the real significance of the report, not the fact that the number of cases filed ticked down somewhat in 2005. As discussed in detail in my earlier post, I agree that not much, if anything, can be read into the decline in the number of cases filed in 2005. So too, apparently, does Bill Lerach, who is quoted in this article on the report as saying that:
"I don't think you can draw any conclusions,'' said William Lerach, the lead attorney in the Enron case and one of the nation's top securities fraud lawyers. "The ocean comes in, the ocean goes out. It doesn't feel any different to me.''
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Wednesday, January 4, 2006 |
Thoughts on the Stanford/Cornerstone Report
Stanford University Law School and Cornerstone Research released their Securities Class Action Case Filings report yesterday which showed that the overall number of federal securities class actions filed in 2005 decreased more than 17%, falling from 213 filings to 176. The press release announcing the report includes a great quote from Stanford's Joseph Grundfest, who helps explain the drop by stating that "The pig may have moved through the python." Prof. Grundfest adds that "Two factors are likely responsible for the decline. First, lawsuits arising from the dramatic boom and bust of U.S. equities in the late 1990s and early 2000s are now largely behind us. Second, improved governance in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom frauds may have reduced the actual incidence of fraud." I'll preface this by simply admitting up front that Prof. Grundfest has forgotten more about securities law and securities litigation than I will ever know, but let me play devil's advocate a bit on whether the decline noted in the report is (a) significant, or (b) due to those factors. First, I would suggest that the 2005 decline of 37 cases (17%) does not appear to be historically significant. To the contrary, it appears to be directly in line with the pattern of the last 9 years. Look at the chart on page 3 of the report ("CAF Index -- Number of Class Action Filings"): It shows that since 1997, the number of securities class action filings has gone up and down in a narrow range with pretty amazing consistency: up a bit every even year, down a bit every odd year. Looking at the declines in the odd years, they have been as follows: 1999: down 34 cases (14%) 2001: down 37 cases (17%) 2003: down 45 cases (19%) 2005: down 37 cases (17%) Draw your own conclusion on whether 2005's decline is significant in some way, but I'm personally not seeing any pig through any python. To the contrary, I'm seeing a very consistent number of cases year over year (around 195 plus or minus 15%), which may simply reflect, in the words of MoFo's Jordan Eth, "the speed of Bill Lerach's printing press." Second, while we would all like to hope that improved corporate governance arrived last year in the wake of Enron and WorldCom and reduced the number of filings, it is not at all clear to me that this is the case. Indeed, today I read in this New York Times article that Earnings restatements, for instance, reached a high in 2005, more than 50 percent higher than the previous year. The restatements often involved plain accounting issues, like when to recognize earnings or properly calculate interest accruals. About a quarter of the restatements were related to the failure by companies to follow accounting rules issued more than 30 years ago on how to account for leases. But the numbers suggest that there is more work to be done. Through the end of October, there were 1,031 restatements, compared with 650 for all of 2004 and only 270 in 2001, the year Enron collapsed, according to figures compiled by Glass, Lewis. Turner said he expected the total number to reach about 1,200 restatements for all of 2005. The article adds that this increasing number may be due in part to "the greater vigilance of auditors and the new requirements by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which has prompted more than 1,250 companies to report by the end of October that they had material weaknesses in their internal controls, out of a total of around 15,000 public companies." Statistics like these about restatements--which inevitably lead to securities class actions--lead me to conclude that the "false financials" cases are from from being out of the system, and that the corporate governance measures that followed Enron and WorldCom may lead to an increase rather than a decrease in securities class actions over the next few years.
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Tuesday, December 20, 2005 |
Guest Post: "Score One For Merck"
Guest Post by Adam T. Savett:
Score one for Merck on the securities class action front. The Third Circuit has affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the securities class actions related to Merck’s planned 2002 initial public offering of its wholly owned subsidiary, Medco Health Solutions, Inc., and Medco’s aggressive revenue-recognition policy. Of note, the Court was faced with the question of whether a lead plaintiff can retain new counsel for an appeal without securing court approval - an apparent issue of first impression for an appellate court.
The lead plaintiff, Union Investments Privatfonds GmbH, a German asset manager, had selected (and the District Court approved) Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP as lead counsel for the class. After the District Court dismissed the complaint, the lead plaintiff retained Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman as "appellate counsel" but had neither sought nor obtained the District Court’s approval of Milberg Weiss as class counsel. Merck challenged Milberg Weiss’ ability to prosecute the appeal without court approval. The Third Circuit allowed Milberg Weiss to act as appellate counsel, but issued a bright line ruling for future litigants, holding that:
"all retentions of class counsel by the lead plaintiff - whether lead counsel, trial counsel, or appellate counsel - require court approval under the PSLRA."
The full opinion is available here.
The same Third Circuit panel also remanded the District Court’s dismissal of the related derivative cases for conversion to a summary judgment motion. The Court’s opinion in the derivative case is available here.
The securities class actions related to Merck’s alleged failure to disclose problems with VIOXX are still pending before Judge Chesler in the District of New Jersey, the same judge who had dismissed the Medco related actions. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad & Schulman and Stull, Stull & Brody are co-lead counsel in the VIOXX related securities case.
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Monday, December 19, 2005 |
The Automatic Lawsuit?
Please disabuse me of my naiveté if I'm wrong here, but I have to think something is lost in the translation in the statement below from this article published in the Canadian Gazette.
The article discusses the current fever pitch of Canadian class actions and states:
In the U.S., the situation can be much more extreme.
New York firm Milberg Weiss set up a system where as soon as the stock price of a company falls more than a certain percentage on the markets in one day, a class action suit is automatically filed.
I'm not even sure what an "automatically filed lawsuit" would be, but I'm quite dubious of this statement. Please weigh in if anyone out there can clarify, confirm or deny.
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Friday, December 16, 2005 |
More on Who is Driving Securities Class Actions
The Denver Post has this article following up on the recent chatter in the securities litigation blogosphere over a particularly "honest" footnote in the Molson Coors opinion written by Judge Jordan of the federal court in Delaware. In case you missed it, the Court characterized the pending motion for appointment of lead plaintiff and approval of counsel in that case as a decision on "which of the plaintiffs' law firms will win the money race," and continued at some length to air its views on whether the Congressional goal of making class action securities cases more client-driven and less lawyer-driven has been realized.
The article has some choice quotes from lawyers, academics, and yours truly:
Bill Lerach of Lerach Coughlin: "It is one judge's opinion. It is one out of 200 or 300 judges. I don't happen to agree with what he says. In my own experience, the clients are very much involved in the case."
Joe Grundfest, professor of law and business at Stanford Law School: "I think the judge has hit the nail squarely on the head. In the vast majority of cases, the lawyers are almost certainly in the driver's seat and the clients exert little if any meaningful supervision over the negotiation of fees or over the substantive litigation."
Bruce Carton, vice president of Institutional Shareholders Services' Securities Class Action Services: "Whoa, who slipped the truth serum to Judge Jordan of the federal court in Delaware?" (quoting from this post on Securities Litigation Watch).
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Monday, December 12, 2005 |
Refco Jockeying Heats Up at Deadline
Forbes has this interesting article about the most recent flurry of maneuverings amongst plaintiffs' lawyers hoping to win the money race, er, I mean be appointed lead plaintiff in the Refco securities class action. The article notes that today is the deadline by which "law firms jockeying for control of the Refco securities litigation must submit their applications for lead counsel."
Among the many reported contenders:
- Lerach Coughlin: filing on behalf of the city of Pontiac, Michigan.
- Scott+ Scott: filing on behalf of the Frontpoint Financial Services Fund.
- Grant & Eisenhofer: filing on behalf of the Pimco funds group.
The article notes that other law firms are waiting until the last minute--i.e., today--to file the lawsuits that will reveal their institutional plaintiffs.
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Thursday, December 8, 2005 |
Heads Up, Diebold
I have no idea what to make of this.
An organization called "VelvetRevolution.us, a coalition of more than 130 progressive organizations demanding electoral reform," issued this press release today stating that it is
seeking plaintiffs for a potential class action securities litigation against Diebold, Inc. (stock symbol: DBD). The class for the suit will involve shareholders who purchased or owned stock in the Ohio-based company any time between Oct. 22, 2003 and Sept. 21, 2005. The lawsuit will involve securities fraud violations and other troubling matters by the controversial company, its CEO, and other current and former members of its Board of Directors.
A visit to the VelvetRevolution.us website provided a bit more information. Citing exclusive information from the Brad Blog, the coalition's home page states that the case is a "developing potential class action securities litigation" against Diebold that is "currently being drawn up." It further states that those who owned or purchased Diebold stock are asked to contact VelvetRevolution.us "where contact information submitted may be turned over to attorneys currently working on the case for possible addition to the plaintiff class."
It will be interesting to see which plaintiffs' attorneys, if any, surface as the recipients of the information resulting from this effort. In the meantime, heads up Diebold, the VelvetRevolution is after you!
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Wednesday, December 7, 2005 |
Who is Driving Securities Class Actions?
Whoa, who slipped the truth serum to Judge Jordan of the federal court in Delaware? As discussed in detail in this post on the PSLRA Nugget blog, the Court used the opportunity of a motion for appointment of lead plaintiff and approval of counsel in the Molson Coors case (or as the Court put it, a decision on "which of the plaintiffs' law firms will win the money race") to air its views on whether the Congressional goal of making class action securities cases more client-driven and less lawyer-driven has been realized.
See if you can read the tea leaves and divine the Court's opinion via this snippet:
The market's response to the news from Molson Coors was not kind. Shares of the company immediately fell by nearly 20%, the fifth-largest loss that day among New York Stock Exchange listed companies. (Id. at 62.)
Price shifts of the magnitude experienced by Molson Coors stock on April 28 do not go unnoticed by securities litigators. In short order, suit was filed....
Check out footnote 4 of the opinion (2005 WL 3271488) for more of the court's "honest[y] about what appears to be at stake."
UPDATE: A copy of the Court's opinion is available here, courtesy of Adam T. Savett. Thanks, Adam!
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Tuesday, November 29, 2005 |
ABA Teleconference/Webcast: Loss Causation After Dura
The ABA's Section of Litigation has organized what should be an interesting program on "Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Securities Class Actions Post Dura Pharmaceuticals." A panel consisting of plaintiffs' counsel, defense counsel and a damages expert will cover subjects including:
- How must loss causation be pled in order to meet the standard?
- Must a specific corrective disclosure that causes a stock drop be alleged?
- Does the Dura decision encourage issuers to delay or bury harmful disclosures in order to make proof of loss causation more difficult?
- How does the decision affect the calculation of damages?
Considering that I've been "answering" all the loss causation questions sent my way by reporters by saying "I have no idea, call Lyle Roberts," I think I probably need to sign myself up!
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Monday, November 28, 2005 |
Still More on the ILR Study
Investment News has this article offering analysis of the ILR study previously discussed at length here and elsewhere on SLW. The article includes the following quotes from me:
Some involved in tracking securities litigation question the study's results. "It's a strange way to look at it," commented Bruce Carton, vice president of Securities Class Action Services, a service offered by Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. in Rockville, Md., that tracks securities litigation and files claims for about 100 institutions.
He cites as an example losses of billions of dollars by the New York State Common Retirement Fund in Albany as a result of fraud perpetrated by WorldCom Inc., now MCI Inc. of Ashburn, Va. "They lost that money," Mr. Carton said. "They bought WorldCom securities and took a huge hit. The premise of the study appears to be that somewhere else they were the beneficiaries of holding inflated stock that that they sold at a good time. Who's to say that that's true or not? In any individual case, you're never going to know."
Further, Mr. Carton argued, large institutional investors invest money for individuals. "A pension fund or a mutual fund ultimately is making money to distribute to you and I."
I'm still waiting for some explanation why the second point above--that institutions such as pension funds and mutual funds are aggregations of individual investor interests--does not undercut the study's conclusion that individual investors get the "short end of the stick" because, unlike institutions, they are unlikely to be sufficiently diversified to get enough of the "'winning' transactions (i.e., from selling a security at what is alleged to be an artificially inflated price)" to offset their losses from "losing" transactions caused by securities fraud.
The article also notes that the ILR's goal is to advance legislation dealing with securities litigation, and is looking at areas such as "how damages are calculated in securities class actions; stopping discovery proceedings while defendants' motions to dismiss cases are pending; requiring lead plaintiff's attorneys to bid competitively to be named lead counsel in class actions; as well as ways to better distribute funds to individual investors."
I think all of these areas are worthy of some real scrutiny (although discovery already is supposed to be stayed under the PSLRA while a motion to dismiss is pending). I just don't find the ILR study (as I understand it) to be a real red flag indicating that securities litigation reform is necessary. To me, it seems like another reminder to investors of the importance of diversification.
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Tuesday, November 22, 2005 |
The Dura Aftermath
The PSLRA Nugget has been tracking many of the post-Dura outcomes such as this one and that one and concludes in this post about a recent decision in the Cisco Systems litigation that
There’s seems to be two trends emerging in loss causation. The first is that over the past seven months, Defendants who already lost motions to dismiss in securities class actions have been filing Rule 12(c) motions to dismiss based on Dura. This has resulted in the second trend -- Defendants losing those motions.
What say you, 10b-5 Daily?
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Thursday, November 17, 2005 |
"Breaking the Banks"
Posted here is a must read article by Andrew Longstreth of the American Lawyer about the personalities, strategies, and turning points that led up to the $6+ billion settlement in the WorldCom securities class action. If you thought that no one could write 10 interesting pages about securities litigation, this article proves you (and me) wrong.
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Wednesday, November 2, 2005 |
Qwest Communications International: No.11
The SCAS database indicates that the $400 million Qwest Communications International settlement, if approved, will be the 11th largest securities class action settlement on record (of cases filed January 1, 1996 to present). Our Top 25, including tentative settlements (in red) such as Qwest, is listed below. Notably, the price of admission to crack the Top 25 has now reached $150 million.
| RANK | Case Name | Total Settlement Amount |
| 1 | Enron Corp. | $ 7,144,500,000 |
| 2 | WorldCom, Inc. | $ 6,156,100,670 |
| 3 | Cendant Corp. | $ 3,186,500,000 |
| 4 | AOL Time Warner, Inc. | $ 2,650,000,000 |
| 5 | McKesson HBOC, Inc. | $ 960,000,000 |
| 6 | Lucent Technologies, Inc. | $ 517,150,000 |
| 7 | BankAmerica Corp. | $ 490,000,000 |
| 8 | Dynegy, Inc. | $ 474,050,000 |
| 9 | Raytheon Company | $ 460,000,000 |
| 10 | Waste Management Inc. II | $ 457,000,000 |
| 11 | Qwest Communications International, Inc. | $ 400,000,000 |
| 12 | Global Crossing, Ltd. | $ 345,000,000 |
| 13 | Cendant Corp. (PRIDES) | $ 341,500,000 |
| 14 | Rite Aid Corp. | $ 319,580,000 |
| 15 | Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. | $ 300,000,000 |
| 16 | DaimlerChrysler AG | $ 300,000,000 |
| 17 | Oxford Health Plans, Inc. | $ 300,000,000 |
| 18 | 3Com Corp. | $ 259,000,000 |
| 19 | Waste Management Inc. I | $ 220,000,000 |
| 20 | MicroStrategy, Inc. | $ 192,500,000 |
| 21 | Dole Food Company, Inc. | $ 172,000,000 |
| 22 | Digex Inc. | $ 165,000,000 |
| 23 | Dollar General Corp. | $ 162,000,000 |
| 24 | Bennett Funding Group, Inc. | $ 152,635,000 |
| 25 | Broadcom, Inc. | $ 150,000,000 |
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Thursday, October 27, 2005 |
Reader Feedback on the ILR Report
Yesterday's report from the Institute for Legal Reform that concluded that individual investors are getting the "short end of the stick in the securities class action system as compared to large institutional investors" (discussed here) prompted some interesting and immediate responses from SLW readers, which are cut and pasted below:
1. The report recognizes that if A sells 100 shares to B at a price inflated by $1 per share, A gained $100 and B overpaid by $100. Now if one party is an institutional investor that trades a lot, it is on both sides of the trades fairly evenly, and its gains and losses tend to average out; it could be A in one case and B in another. (More specifically, its average net gain or loss will tend to be a small fraction of its overall holdings.) If another party is a small investor that trades infrequently, it could be a big winner or a big loser, particularly if it has only one trade, either as party A or B. The report correctly points out that the institutional investor is thus somewhat hedged, while the individual could be a big winner or loser. This is not really the same thing as what the press release says when it states,
"The average American investor gets the short end of the stick in the securities class action system as compared to large institutional investors," said ILR President Lisa Rickard. "The stock holdings of individual investors are generally too few in number to offset losses in stock value that follow allegations of securities fraud."
Yes, individuals who are losers in one stock probably are net losers, but half of them are also net winners.
2. The report carefully pointed out in its footnote 11 that it ignores where the funds for the settlement are coming from. That is a big issue! If the funds are coming from the company (i.e., if insurance is small or is recouped through higher premiums), then the results may be completely reversed! That is, a long-term investor, which is more likely to be an institution, will have bought before the class period and thus help pay the settlement (from its share of ownings in the company) but have bought too early to be in the class. If A sells to B and B is compensated from the settlement with outside money, A can win and B can break even or lose only a small amount. But if A, B, or another investor pays for part or all of the settlement, then the results for investors overall are worse. Basically, if you toss in "free" money for the settlement of course investors will generally do well. But if the investors, as shareholders, have to pay for part of the settlement, they will do worse. Add in the leakage to attorneys, and the claim in the press release that "most institutional investors don't simply break even from securities class action settlements; many benefit," is strained. (And besides, if half gained and half lost by chance, one could also say that "many benefit" from just a random redistribution of money, so that part of the claim in the press release is not particularly meaningful as it now stands.)
UPDATE:
3. Another point is that "institutions", i.e. pension funds, mutual funds, are simply aggregation of individual investor interests.
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Wednesday, October 26, 2005 |
ILR Study: Institutions Profit From Securities Fraud/Settlement Combo
The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform has sponsored this interesting study on securities class action litigation that it released today at its 6th Annual Legal Reform Summit. It is a lengthy study that I plan to read and discuss in the future, but as summarized in this press release, the Institute for Legal Reform argues that
“The average American investor gets the short end of the stick in the securities class action system as compared to large institutional investors,” said ILR President Lisa Rickard. “The stock holdings of individual investors are generally too few in number to offset losses in stock value that follow allegations of securities fraud.”
The study was conducted for ILR by Navigant Consulting to determine if private securities class actions are serving the best interests of all investors. It revealed that most institutional investors don’t simply break even from securities class action settlements; many benefit, accumulating the gains of stock prices inflated by alleged fraud and also receiving compensation for losses suffered as a result of disclosure of the alleged fraud."
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Thursday, October 13, 2005 |
More on Passive Voice Press Releases
We saw it back in July, and now we're seeing it again: squabbling between plaintiffs' law firms over what I have dubbed the "passive voice press release." These recurring spats are between Law Firm A that files a securities class action and properly issues a press release/"notice to class members" under Section 21D(a)(3) of the Reform Act; and Law Firm B that follows the filing of such a lawsuit with its own press release that looks every bit like a "notice to class members" but with one slight twist--Law Firm B has not filed a lawsuit. Rather, Law Firm B announces that a lawsuit seeking class action status has been filed [Passive Voice Alert!] in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of all persons who purchased the common stock of XYZ....
Non-English majors in the putative class who read such a press release might reasonably assume that if Law Firm B is going to the trouble of announcing that a lawsuit "has been filed," that just maybe Law Firm B was the firm that actually filed such a lawsuit, and that Law Firm B is a good place to start, therefore, if they want to join in as a plaintiff. At least that seems to be the fear of the Law Firm A's of the world.
In today's spat, Law Firm A is Lerach Coughlin, which filed a securities class action lawsuit against Refco on October 11, and issued this statement yesterday that began as follows:
On October 11, 2005, the law firm of Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP ("Lerach Coughlin") (http://www.lerachlaw.com/cases/refco/) filed a complaint on behalf of all those who purchased the common stock of Refco, Inc. ("Refco" or the "Company") (NYSE: RFX). The complaint alleges a series of false and misleading statements associated with the company's accounting practices and follows a lengthy investigation by Lerach Coughlin. Since Lerach Coughlin filed a complaint, The Law of Firm of Schatz & Nobel has issued a press release claiming to offer "information" about joining the suit. Be advised that this firm has not even filed a complaint. Rather, the press release appears to be an advertisement designed to solicit clients so that the firm can participate in this case.
Schatz & Nobel's passive voice press release that prompted this statement is available here. Curiously, the press release contains this sentence at the end:
While Schatz & Nobel has not filed a lawsuit against the defendants, to view a copy of the Complaint initiating the class action or for more information about the case, class action cases in general, and your rights, please contact Schatz & Nobel toll-free....
Does that mean that if you contact S&N to view a copy of the complaint "initiating the class action" that they will provide you with the Lerach Coughlin complaint?
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Tuesday, October 11, 2005 |
Kill Bill Vol. 2
A legal publication called "Lawdragon" has this rather irreverent article entitled "Kill Bill Vol. 2" about the federal investigation of Milberg Weiss and Bill Lerach. This appears to be the maiden issue of "Law Dragon"--I've only heard of it because I was quoted in the article and they mailed me a copy:
“I think that the Lazar case involves isolated allegations involving conduct that probably isn’t very prevalent anymore,” says Bruce Carton, vice president of Securities Class Action Services, a division of Institutional Shareholder Services, which advises institutional investors. “Representation of individual plaintiffs is not really the way that these plaintiffs’ firms make money in securities litigation these days.”
(I am graciously choosing to forgive the Lawdragon for calling me Bruce Carlton in a highlighted quote).
The "why-didn't-I-think-of-it-first" title of the article is a play on the idea that the current federal investigation of Lerach is "Volume 2" while "Kill Bill, Volume 1, came in 1995, when Congress passed what was dubbed the 'Get Lerach Act,' aimed at stopping the prolific filing of suits by Milberg Weiss and its star attorney)". But as the header of the article blares,
He's annoying, obnoxious and greedy, with fewer friends than a Saturday night truck stop. After fending off an armored assault by the U.S. Congress, he's once again in the crosshairs. They may take down Lerach. They may not. But one thing is certain: The forces of Bill will survive.
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Guest Post: "Getting More for Investors"
The commentary below by Wayne Schneider, General Counsel for the New York State Teachers' Retirement System, is the first of what I hope will be many "guest posts" here at SLW. Mr. Schneider writes about the impact that institutional investors are having on securities class action litigation, particularly in the area of attorneys' fees.
If you have an interesting securities litigation-related article, memo or opinion, please consider sending it to me for possible publication as a "guest post" on this web site.
Thanks,
Bruce Carton
Getting More for Investors
by Wayne Schneider, General Counsel, New York State Teachers' Retirement System*
When considering the impact of the 1996 Reform Act on federal securities class actions, the actual and potential future impact that responsible institutional investors are having on the fees awarded to class counsel in federal securities class actions cannot be stressed enough. The plaintiffs’ class action bar will routinely argue that class counsel fee awards in federal securities have been, and still are, in the 30% range. Yet, responsible institutional investors serving as lead plaintiffs under the Reform Act are demonstrating that competent class counsel can be reasonably compensated for their efforts in federal securities class actions by fees which are substantially below the 30% level and, indeed, substantially below 20%.
Everyone is undoubtedly familiar with the fee award in the Cendant litigation which settled in 2000. The settlement was over $3 billion. The fee award, however, was only $55 million because of the retainer agreement class counsel had entered into with the New York City Pension Funds, the New York State Common Retirement Fund and the California Public Employees’ Retirement System serving as lead plaintiffs.
Can there be any doubt as to the magnitude of the benefit which these institutional investors conferred on the class by driving a hard bargain on class counsel fees? Let’s do the math. Suppose the fee award had been 30% in line with what the plaintiffs’ class action bar claims is the “standard” for class counsel fees in federal securities class actions. Had the fee award been 30%, Cendant investors would realized over $845 million less from that settlement than they actually did as a result of the fee deal that was, in fact, negotiated. Even if the fee award had “only” been 20%, that award would have meant over $545 million less in the pockets of Cendant investors. The dollar value of the savings on counsel fees undoubtedly realized in the Cendant case by itself dwarfs the settlement amounts in all but a handful of federal securities class actions!
Fortunately, the Cendant case is not an isolated instance but instead only one of the most remarkable examples of the way in which responsible institutional investors may be reshaping forever the perception of what should constitute a reasonable fee for plaintiffs’ class counsel when a federal securities class action finally settles. Other examples of favorable fee arrangements reached by responsible institutional investors serving as lead plaintiffs include the following:
• Class counsel agreed to seek a fee award not to exceed 17% of the 2004 settlement having a value of $102 million in the Symbol Technologies Inc. case. The lead plaintiffs are the Louisiana Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System, the Louisiana Sheriff’s Pension & Relief Fund and the City of Miami General Employees’ & Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust.
• Class counsel agreed to seek a fee of 10.5% in the Homestore.com, Inc. case which was settled in 2003 for $13 million in cash and 20 million shares of Homestore.com common stock, for a total reported value of $93 million. California Teachers’ Retirement System was the lead plaintiff in that case.
• Class counsel agreed to seek a fee of 17% in the Gemstar-TVGuide International, Inc. case which settled in 2004 for $67.5 million. The lead plaintiffs in that case are the Teachers’ Retirement System of Louisiana and the General Retirement System of the City of Detroit. (As it happened, the court awarded a fee equal to approximately 13.6% of the settlement.) Other claims were settled more recently for $25 million and class counsel is seeking a fee not to exceed 20% of the settlement.
• Class counsel agreed to seek a fee of 14% in the Providian Financial Corp. case which settled in 2004 for $65 million. The lead plaintiff was the Retirement Systems of Alabama.
• Class counsel agreed to seek a fee of 15% in the Enterasys Networks, Inc. case which settled in 2004 for $50 million in cash and stock. The Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association was lead plaintiff in that case.
• Class counsel agreed to seek a fee of 10.5% in the Critical Path, Inc. case which settled in 2002 settled for $17 million plus 850,000 warrants. The Florida State Board of Administration was lead plaintiff in that case.
• More recently, class counsel has agreed to seek a fee of 18% in the OM Group, Inc. case which settled for $92.4 million. The Policemen & Firemen Retirement System of the City of Detroit is the lead plaintiff in that case.
And then we have this year’s “blockbuster” settlements:
• In the Bristol-Myers Squibb Securities case which settled for $300 million, the fee originally agreed to by class counsel was 15% but that fee was reduced in subsequent negotiations to 7.5%. (The court eventually awarded a fee equal to approximately 4% of the settlement.) The lead plaintiffs were the Teachers’ Retirement System of Louisiana, the Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System, General Retirement System of the City of Detroit, and Fresno County Employees’ Retirement Association.
• In the Dynegy case which settled for $473 million, class counsel agreed to seek a fee not to exceed 9% of the settlement. The Regents of the University of California are the lead plaintiff in that case.
• In most spectacular case, class counsel in the Worldcom, Inc. cases agreed to accept a fee of only 5.5% of the $3.55 billion in settlements achieved in 2005. The New York State Common Retirement Fund is the lead plaintiff in that case.
There has been some recognition of the efforts of responsible institutional investors in reducing fee requests. For example, the court in the Motorola case remarked in 2003 that lead plaintiff New Jersey State Treasurer had entered into retainer agreements providing for fees which are “‛significantly below’” the level of fees often theretofore awarded by courts. In the academic community, Professor Lisa L. Casey wrote in her 2003 article entitled “Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging” in the Brigham Young University Law Review:
“Experience demonstrates that institutions applying for the role of lead plaintiff can and do negotiate fee agreements with putative lead counsel before selecting attorneys for the class. In the Waste Management megalitigation, for example, lead plaintiff Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust funds negotiated a contingent fee agreement with lead counsel....The pact included a provision capping attorneys’ fees if the case settled after resolution of motions to dismiss but before a decision on motions for summary judgment. The court approved the contract fees as reasonable and awarded counsel 7.93% of the case recovered for the class in the megasettlement, or $36.225 million of the $457 million recovery fund. Acting as lead plaintiff in the megalawsuit arising from the Enron debacle, the University of California Board of Regents also negotiated a contingent fee contract with lead counsel Milberg Weiss calling for a fee below 10% of any recovery--again, substantially lower than the 25% benchmark previously utilized by many courts.”
Even members of the plaintiffs class action bar will, in unguarded moments, acknowledge the impact responsible institutional investors can have in substantially lowering fee requests in federal securities class actions. For example, in a 2004 newsletter, one plaintiffs’ class action firm stated the following:
“...public fund plaintiffs have sharply reduced the percentage of the settlement pool that goes to the lawyers who represent [investors] in securities class actions. In cases where individuals act as lead plaintiffs, contingent fees have historically ranged up to 33%. But institutional investors have the sophistication and the commitment to the class they represent to negotiate significantly lower fees.
“Institutions look for ways to ensure that attorney fees are reasonable and reflect the results obtained, as well as the time and effort expended. Their fee agreements often include anti-windfall provisions and other incentives that tie the lawyers’ share to the size of the recovery and the length of the proceedings.
“The New York State Common Retirement System last year issued a Request for Proposals in which all responding securities litigation counsel agreed to a fee scale that set fees of 8% to 14% for settlements under $100 million. Larger settlements are governed by a multi-tier system that lowers the percentage even more. Other funds have come up with similar formulas to keep legal fees reasonable, providing a valuable service not only to their plan members but also to the wider pool of shareholders entitled to part of the settlement.”
There is no reason to believe that responsible, properly informed institutional investors serving as lead plaintiffs cannot secure lower fees in federal securities class actions for the benefit of the investor class they are representing. Counsel for public sector funds, for example, can attest to a highly competitive environment in which plaintiffs class action firms are vigorously competing with each other to represent public sector funds. Counsel for public sector funds are routinely bombarded with all manner of promotional material from plaintiffs class action firms and invited to lavish conferences and other activities designed to promote the firms’ capabilities in the prosecution of federal securities class actions. Representatives of plaintiffs class action firms regularly attend meetings of organizations in which public sector funds participate and importune representatives of public sector plans in an effort to drum business.
Unfortunately, outside the circles of plaintiffs class action firms and public sector funds, the efforts of responsible lead plaintiffs in driving down fees have attracted little attention. The lack of discussion in the media of the level of fees have been negotiated leaves a considerable opening for class action firms to continue to recruit lead plaintiffs who have no knowledge of what kind of fees can be obtained through obtaining bids from competing law firms and hard negotiation. Organizations like ISS can perform a genuine service for investors by examining and publicizing the efforts of those lead plaintiffs who truly benefit investors by obtaining substantially reduced fee requests.
*The views expressed in this commentary represent only the views of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the institution by which he is employed.
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Friday, September 23, 2005 |
Siebel Systems: Securities Litigation Magnet
Does any company get sued for securities-related claims more than Siebel Systems? It seemed that Siebel's plate was already full, what with a pending securities class action lawsuit and not one but two cases against it by the SEC for alleged violations of Reg FD. Less than two weeks after actually winning the second Reg FD case outright on September 1, 2005, however, Siebel has been sued yet again, this time for alleged breach of fiduciary duty in connection with its acquisition by Oracle. According to Siebel's Form 8-K filed September 19,
On September 12, 2005, Siebel and members its board of directors were named in a purported class action complaint filed in California in the San Mateo County Superior Court. The case is captioned Showers v. Siebel et al., No. CIV 449535. The complaint alleges that defendants entered into an agreement for the purchase of Siebel without having performed an active auction or conducted open bidding procedures for sale of Siebel, and that the consideration to be paid pursuant to the acquisition agreement is inadequate. The complaint also alleges that the individuals named as defendants have acted and are acting contrary to their duty.
So, Siebel, you had your eleven days off--it's time to fire up the litigation war room again!
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SLW Jeopardy Winner is...
Once again naming our contest winner came down to a contentious meeting of the already-overworked SLW Contest Rules Committee. After much deliberation, the SLW Jeopardy Winner is one Mark Sakana, who provided the first of many correct responses (1) in the Comments field and (2) in the form of a question:
"What is the amount of attorneys' fees that will be paid out in light of the final approval order entered in the Worldcom case yesterday?"
As stated in this September 21, 2005 Order from Judge Cote approving the WorldCom settlement,
Finally, the fact that an active and well-qualified Lead Plaintiff has approved this fee and that the Class has not objected to it are also appropriate to consider when judging the public policy of approving a fee award that in its aggregate gives Lead Counsel $336.1 million in fees based on a total lodestar of approximately $83.2 million.
Honorable mention goes to the SLW reader who shall remain nameless who (1) emailed me the first correct answer (2) not in the form of a question.
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Wednesday, September 21, 2005 |
SLW Jeopardy: "What is $336.1 million?"
Welcome to the first installment of "SLW Jeopardy". Your challenge, of course, is to be the first to buzz in (using the Comment function) and provide the Question that goes with this Answer:
Answer: What is $336.1 million?
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Tuesday, August 23, 2005 |
Litigation About Litigation
The hypothetical "shareholder lawsuits" against Milberg Weiss apparently up for discussion at the WLF webcast discussed here add another data point to something that I'll just call "Litigation about Litigation." (Item 413 on Carton to-do list: Call Pat Riley and ask how to get this term trademarked).
More specifically for this blog, we could even call it "securities class actions about securities class actions." I know I am leaving some out, but in 2005 we've already seen the securities class actions against mutual funds for their alleged failure to file claims in securities class action settlements, as well as the supposedly imminent securities class action against CIBC claiming losses caused by CIBC's massive settlement of the claims against it in the Enron securities class action settlement.
Litigation about litigation? Can't we all just get along?
With respect to the CIBC Litigation about Litigation, by the way, the Toronto Globe and Mail has this amusing take on that perpetual litigation machine:
While CIBC's shareholders may indeed have the right to feel like they're stuck in the intensive care unit without health coverage, the logic in taking this to court would seem distinctly fuzzy. If they blame the Enron settlement for hitting the value of their shares, what happens when their lawsuit is launched? Won't the share price drop even further? And when that happens, shouldn't they sue themselves? And eventually, won't they have to end up paying billions to themselves to have their own lawsuit go away?
In the end, CIBC's share price would be sucked in on itself and go into negative territory, a kind of financial black hole that only Stephen Hawking would understand.
If you have other examples of securities-related litigation about litigation, please submit them to me.
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Fire, Meet Gasoline
A DC-based "legal think tank" called the Washington Legal Foundation has organized a webcast ominously entitled "Trial Lawyers’ Enron: Will Indictments & Investigations Expose Bill Lerach and Milberg Weiss to Shareholder Lawsuits?" The event promises to explore "the latest developments in the criminal probe of the Milberg Weiss law firm" and, among other things, "what legal strategies might be available to shareholders and other parties affected by the class action lawsuits under investigation?"
The WLF website states that one of the goals of its Investor Protection Program is to "encourage regulatory oversight of plaintiffs' bar within securities industry." The website also includes praise from new SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, who is quoted there as stating that "I am appreciative for WLF's constant effort to combat a subset of lawyers who attack businesses with frivolous lawsuits and outrageous punitive damage awards."
Presumably the lawyers bringing any shareholder lawsuit against Milberg would be WLF-approved lawyers who only file non-frivolous lawsuits seeking non-outrageous punitive damages.
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Tuesday, August 9, 2005 |
Enron: Plaintiffs' Counsel's Legal Fees $700 Million and Climbing
According to the August 8 Legal Times, the settlements to date in the Enron securities class action will, if approved, pay the plaintiffs' law firms nearly $700 million in legal fees. And we're still just getting started.
As noted in the article, CIBC's $2.4 billion settlement last week to settle allegations that it helped disguise losses at Enron Corp. has raised the stakes for the seven remaining banks involved in the massive securities class action, as well as for law firm defendant Vinson & Elkins. The article states that "Lead plaintiffs attorney William Lerach of Lerach, Coughlin, Stoia, Geller, Rudman & Robbins says his legal team is 'taking depositions daily' in the case and that his firm is pursuing a policy of escalating the cost of settling through 'brute force' negotiations."
The trial is currently scheduled for October 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
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More on Securities Class Action Trials
The National Law Journal has this interesting article following up on some of the data and analysis we have been presenting at SLW about the recent surge in securities class action trials. The article notes that:
But this year, an unusual thing is happening. Six securities class actions have gone to trial, out of a total of nine such trials involving alleged misconduct after the law took effect a decade ago, according to figures compiled by Bruce Carton, director of Institutional Shareholders Services. This is out of roughly 1,733 federal securities class actions that were filed between 1996 and 2004, according to Cornerstone Research in Menlo Park, Calif.
I think it's actually 6 out of 10, but you get the point.
Why the surge? The article offers some insights from lawyers who have been involved:
- Michael Tu, a partner at Orrick who recently tried the Thane International case, believes that trials are increasing because settlement amounts are skyrocketing. "It is causing a shift in the settlement landscape and a shift in the way both sides look at a case," he said.
The article adds that "A whole generation of cases that began after the stock market bubble burst has reached the point of maturity, surviving dismissal or summary judgment motions, Tu said, and people now have to make decisions about whether to go to trial. And regulators such as New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer have been much more aggressive, which generates a lot of discoverable material that plaintiffs can use in their civil suits, he said." - Ron Miller, an economist at NERA Economic Consulting, "suspects that the cases with bigger market losses are more likely to go to trial because of the cost-benefit analysis. Trials are expensive, and a small case is not worth anyone spending all that time or money in court....'My suspicion is that there have been so few of these trials that a few people have gotten the same idea at the same time; it is time to test the waters,' he said."
- Michael Young of Willkie Farr & Gallagher recalled being the first lawyer to take a case to trial based on post-litigation reform act conduct by a client-- a four-week trial that absolved Chicago accounting firm BDO Seidman LLP of wrongdoing in its audit of Health Management Inc. of Holbrook, N.Y. When he started looking for sample jury instructions, "the judge in New York said there were no models available because his 1999 trial was the first. "
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Thursday, August 4, 2005 |
Note to Self: Must Blog Earlier
This securities litigation blogging stuff is getting to be competitive. Two items that I was going to post about this morning have already been highlighted by the blogosphere, so I'll just flag them here and point you in the right direction.
1. Bad Martha! --ATVs, yoga = 3 more weeks with the irritating anklet.
2. 135,685 years --Former Cendant Vice Chairman ordered to personally pay back $3.27 billion to shareholders. Doh!!
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Thursday, July 21, 2005 |
Counting Up the Securities Class Action Trials, Part IV
Count Carton is back, this time with a recently published article by Michael Tu of the Orrick law firm, who successfully tried the Thane International securities litigation to a defense verdict last month.
The article, which appears in the July 2005 Securities Reform Act Litigation Reporter, provides a detailed analysis of the securities class actions that have made it to trial since the enactment of the PSLRA. Happily, his findings appear to track closely with the collective knowledge on this topic of the readers of SLW, which most recently was collected and posted here (and I particularly like his footnote 1).
A copy of the article is available here.
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Tuesday, July 19, 2005 |
Nothing But Furniture and Silverware
According to Sean Coffey of Bernstein Litowitz, lead counsel in the securities class action against WorldCom, the recent settlement with Bernie Ebbers (discussed here) will only leave the Ebbers family "with their furniture and the silverware."
That doesn't quite meet the standard laid down by former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden, who once famously stated that he wanted to leave people who engaged in insider trading "naked, homeless and without wheels," but it is in the ballpark.
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Thursday, July 7, 2005 |
Make it 6 out of 10
In my article from the July 2005 SCAS Alert (posted here), I noted that
data collected by SCAS shows that only nine securities class actions based on post-Reform Act conduct have reached trial. Notably, however, including the two trials in June, five of these trials have occurred in the last 12 months.
As of yesterday we can bump that up by one--ten securities class actions based on post-Reform Act conduct have now reached trial, six of which have come in the last 12 months.
Reports from the SDNY are that a trial began yesterday in the Globalstar Telecommunications securities litigation, with the selection of a jury and the presentation of opening statements. Steve Toll of Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll delivered the opening statement for the plaintiffs and Francis Menton from Wilkie Farr did so for Bernard Schwartz (litigation is reportedly stayed as to all corporate defendants as a result of their bankruptcies). Plaintiffs are expected to present their first witnesses today.
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See You in Court
The following article first appeared in the July 2005 SCAS Alert:
See You in Court: Examing the Recent Spike in Securities Class Action Trials
by Bruce T. Carton, Vice President, ISS’ Securities Class Action Services
In a span of two weeks in June, two law firm press releases crossed our desk alerting us to trials in securities class actions. First, on June 8, the Orrick law firm announced that direct marketing company Thane International Inc. had just received a defense verdict in a shareholder suit after a weeklong trial in federal court in California. Next, on June 17, the Grant & Eisenhofer law firm announced that it had successfully represented a group of institutional bondholders in a seven-week jury trial in federal court in South Carolina, ultimately obtaining a $200 million judgment against the former CEO and CFO, respectively, of Safety-Kleen Corp., as well as a last-minute settlement with PricewaterhouseCoopers.
The fact that two trials in securities class actions were ongoing at the same time was itself extraordinary--trials in such cases are the rarest of occurrences. Focusing on the post-Private Securities Litigation Reform Act era, the SCAS database indicates that since Jan. 1, 1996, there have been well over 1,300 settlements in federal securities class actions. By comparison, data collected by SCAS shows that only nine securities class actions based on post-Reform Act conduct have reached trial. Notably, however, including the two trials in June, five of these trials have occurred in the last 12 months:
- AT&T Securities Litigation (2004), (settled after three weeks of trial for $100 million);
- Clarent Corp. (2005) (plaintiffs' verdict);
- Thane International (2005) (defense verdict);
- Safety-Kleen (2005) (settled during trial with PricewaterhouseCoopers; $200 million judgment as a matter of law against two officers who did not show up for trial);
- WorldCom (2005) ($65 million settlement with Arthur Andersen after four weeks of trial).
Seeing no obvious reason for this spike in trials in the last 12 months, I sought answers from some of the lawyers involved in these trials. One reason suggested by several lawyers--and supported by the settlement data--is that the dramatic increase over the past few years in the dollar amounts of settlements has raised plaintiffs' expectations and caused some defendants to take a stand rather than pay what they consider to be an unreasonable settlement. Indeed, the SCAS database shows that there was a record $6 billion in final settlements in 2004.
Michael Tu of Orrick, who defended Thane International at trial along with his partner Dan Tyukody, believes that higher settlement demands may be a cause of the recent surge in trials. Tu observes that, "the post-Enron political climate and aggressive behavior by federal and state regulators in recent years are driving increasing settlement amounts against companies, financial institutions and their officers and directors. This has encouraged plaintiffs in shareholder class actions to hold out for even higher settlements, increasing the likelihood of trial." Tu adds that "while in past years companies with good facts and meritorious defenses might have chosen to settle for business reasons or because of the economics of defending such a case through trial, now in many cases the relative risk of going to trial is narrowing because of these increased settlement values."
Doug McKeige, a partner with Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann, agrees that settlement values are playing a role. Bernstein Litowitz was lead plaintiffs' counsel and handled the trials in both the Clarent case and the WorldCom case (which also had over $6 billion in settlements with other defendants). According to McKeige, "the old benchmarks to gauge settlement values are getting blown away. Strong minded institutional lead plaintiffs expect a full measure of damages--especially if they have confidence in their chosen counsel to out duel their adversaries in the courtroom."
There may be another explanation. Steve Toll, a partner with Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, whose firm is actively preparing to represent investors at trial in early July in the Globalstar securities litigation, believes that the fact that corporations now often have many layers of insurance coverage becomes an impediment to reaching a reasonable settlement. Toll believes that "when the primary carrier refuses to put its entire policy on the table, it allows the carriers who are the second, third, fourth and/or fifth tier of coverage to say they have no obligation to pay because the primary carrier (and possibly the initial excess carriers) have not exhausted their policy."
Finally, Stu Grant, a partner with Grant & Eisenhofer who recently tried the Safety-Kleen case, says that although he can't explain why there has been a surge of trials lately, the fact that these cases are actually going to trial poses some new challenges to the courts and to lawyers. Grant notes that "as more cases are being tried, the courts will have to take on some very tough issues regarding the PSLRA. While Congress gave very broad guidelines in passing the PSLRA, the district courts have to deal with specifics such as jury instructions, burdens of proof, notice issues and the like. The PSLRA is devoid of any such guidance, and thus provides Herculean challenges for the trial courts."
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Wednesday, July 6, 2005 |
NYT: "The Lawyer Companies Love to Hate"
Sometimes articles published over the weekend slip through the cracks but this one from the New York Times is worth resuscitating. Entitled, "The Lawyer Companies Love to Hate," it is a profile of Bill Lerach of Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins. It rehashes some of the Seymour Lazar news from last week, and provides some other pretty provocative background and information about Lerach:
- The article quotes Lerach's lawyer in the Lazar affair, John Keker, as stating that "Bill Lerach has done more to protect shareholders than this S.E.C. and the Department of Justice combined."
- According to the article, Lerach has sued 3com and Intel five times each. It notes that "Once when Alan Shugart, the C.E.O. of Seagate Technology, which was being sued by Mr. Lerach, started a campaign against 'abusive litigation,' Mr. Lerach sent him a note that said, 'Dear Al: More is coming.'"
Asked about the practice of filing "a lot of lawsuits that seem to be based on not much more than some bad news and a big drop in the stock price," the article notes the following response from Lerach:
"We like to have a lot of cases," he said. "That's our business model. It keeps you sharp. It's good training for your young lawyers." He described some of his competitors in the plaintiffs' bar, the ones who stick to big institutional clients and only file lawsuits against the likes of American International Group and WorldCom - as "living off the low-hanging fruit."
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Thursday, June 30, 2005 |
You Might Want to Get in Line Now...
This Notice to Former WorldCom Shareholders was just sent out to the former owners of nearly 3 billion shares of WorldCom advising them that as victims of the WorldCom fraud, they have the right (under the Justice for All Act of 2004) to "be reasonably heard" at any public proceeding in the district court involving sentencing. The Notice gives the sentencing dates for six former WorldCom officers and employees, including Bernie Ebbers (July 13, 2005) and Scott Sullivan (August 4, 2005).
So if any of you former WorldCom shareholders have anything you'd like to say at the sentencing hearing for Ebbers, Sullivan, David Myers, etc., your opportunity is coming soon.
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Wednesday, June 29, 2005 |
Geprellte US-Anleger gehen fast leer aus
I speak to a number of reporters each week about securities class actions, and sometimes these discussions blur together in my memory. The resulting articles are the ultimate reminder of what we discussed--but not when they are written in German, which I don't happen to speak.
So when I got a copy of this article this morning from the June 27 Financial Times Deutschland, not a lot of bells were ringing about what I might have said or what the article was about. According to the article,
Bis der einzelne Investor sein Geld sieht, können jedoch Jahre vergehen. Durchschnittlich dauert es vier bis fünf Jahre, bis eine Vergleichssumme ausgehandelt ist. „Danach vergehen noch einmal knapp zwei Jahre, bis das Geld bei den Investoren ankommt“, sagt Bruce Carton, Sammelklagenexperte der ISS. According to Google Translate, this means: Until the individual investor sees his money, however years can offense. It on the average lasts four to five years, until a comparison sum is negotiated. "after it again scarcely two years offense, until the money arrives with the investors", says Bruce Carton, collecting complaint expert EATS. OK, then. In any event, just going by the graphic in the article, it appears that the article relates to the high cost of a breed of extraordinarily large peanuts. We're talking about peanuts that are approximately the size of a dollar bill. Seriously--when they placed these peanuts on the "scales of justice"-type device in the graphic, just 15 or so of them weighed about the same as a huge pile of rolled U.S. currency.
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Friday, June 24, 2005 |
Bristol-Meyers Squibb/Vanlev Going to Trial?
The New Jersey Star-Ledger has this article discussing a securities class action lawsuit against BMS regarding Vanlev, "a high-blood pressure drug candidate Bristol once touted as a potential billion-dollar seller but abruptly withdrew from clinical trials three years ago." According to the article,
The Vanlev lawsuit is unusual because Bristol appears prepared to go to trial instead of settle out of court. The company paid $839 million in restitution and settlements related to the accounting scandal.
Over the past 12 months, there have been approximately 240 class- action shareholder lawsuits filed nationwide. But only five cases have actually gone to trial since 1995, said Bruce Carton, a vice president at Maryland-based Securities Class Action Services, which tracks such lawsuits.
First, let me just boldly predict (unburdened by any knowledge of the facts or law involved in the case) that the case will not go to trial--as per the statistics from Count Carton above, such trials are incredibly rare and we are, after all, talking about the same BMS that recently settled a different securities class action for $300 million after winning a motion to dismiss.
Second, the statistic attributed to me above that "only five cases have actually gone to trial since 1995" should be clarified--I was referring to the number of Post-Reform Act cases resulting in a verdict, which I then believed to be five ( In re: Health Management; In Re Real Estate Associates Limited Partnerships; In re: Clarent Corp. ; Thane International; and Safety-Kleen. However, as discussed here, Safety-Kleen settled during trial, so the number should be four. Until someone sends me an email about another trial, at which time the number will be back to five. And so on.
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Thursday, June 23, 2005 |
The Passive Voice Press Release
The 10b-5 Daily has a great catch of this unusual press release from the law firm Murray, Frank & Sailer LLP "Cautioning Investors that Only Certain Law Firms Have Initiated a Class Action Lawsuit on Behalf Of Shareholders Against PEMSTAR, Inc."
According to the Murray, Frank law firm, only one complaint has been filed against PEMSTAR, and that is their complaint. However, that has not stopped many other plaintiffs' law firms from issuing their own press releases announcing, in the passive voice, that a class action "was filed" against PEMSTAR, and asking interested class members to contact the law firms issuing the press releases for more information (many of the press releases are available here).
The Murray, Frank press release cautions--and there would appear to be some merit to this argument--that since it has actually done an investigation of PEMSTAR and filed a complaint against the company, it is in a "superior position to answer questions about the claims alleged in the Complaint" as compared to the non-filing-but-still-announcing law firms.
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Counting Up the Securities Class Action Trials, Part III
Greetings from Count Carton.
Here in the SLW Trial Counting Unit we just keep counting up the trials. It now seems like the best way to do this is to further define what we're counting, so here goes:
I. Securities Class Actions Based on Post-Reform Act Conduct Resulting in a Verdict at Trial:
1. In re: Health Management Securities Litigation (BDO Seidman, LLP) (1999)--(Defendant BDO reportedly received a defense verdict in a class action seeking $37 million for BDO's alleged participation in accounting fraud and failure to uncover accounting abuses).
2. In Re Real Estate Associates Limited Partnerships (2002), (reportedly tried to a $184 million jury verdict in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California).
3. In re: Clarent Corp. (2005) (in which Bernstein Litowitz reportedly "obtained only the second securities fraud class action verdict in favor of investors since the 1995 passage of the PSLRA.").
4. Thane International (2005) (defense verdict).
II. Securities Class Actions Based on Post-Reform Act Conduct Resulting in a Settlement/Summary Judgment/Default Judgment During Trial:
1. Equisure (1998)--reportedly a $45.3 million default judgment against Equisure, which failed to show up for the trial!).
2. Cypress Funds (2003) (reported $5 million settlement by First Union after two days of trial)
3. AT&T Securities Litigation (2004), (settled after three weeks of trial for $100 million).
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